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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Respondent,] 
vs. ] 
MICHAEL LEWIS GREEN, AKA ] 
JAMES ALVIN DOUGLAS, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ) ) C a s e N o . 890222-CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
JMISDI.CTI.ON AND_.JATURE....OJ„.JROCMDJJ.GS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment and sentence of the 
Court below from two second degree felony crimes, manufacturing a 
controlled substance, and possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute, P-2-P. Jurisdiction of this Court is 
therefor conferred by Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
and Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
POINT I: 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS 
IMPROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AS OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL 
SEARCH AND SIEZURE, BASED ON LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE 
SEARCH WARRANT 
POINT II: 
EVIDENCE DISCOVERED IN THE SEARCH SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BASED 
ON ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SIEZURE SINCE SEARCHING PARTY WAS A 
GOVENMENT EMPLOYEE OR AGENT, OR WAS ACTING IN SUCH A WAY AS 
TO BE DEEMED A GOVERNMENT AGENT 
POINT III: 
THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE BY THE STATE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT 
OF DUE PROCESS, A FAIR TRIAL, AND OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS 
DEFENSES 
POINT IV: 
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR U.S. ATTORNEY 
GENERAL UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO 
DESIGNATE, RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR 
TRANSFERING SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER 
POINT V: 
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR U.S. ATTORNEY 
GENERAL UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO 
DESIGNATE, RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR 
TRANSFERING SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS A DEPRIVATION OF 
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO REASONABLE NOTICE OF 
PROSCRIBED CONDUCT 
POINT VI: 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE THE JURY INSTRUCTION THAT 
THE STATE HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE PROPRIETY OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR SCHEDULING THE TO-BE-CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by way of information with various 
drug offenses, and was convicted, after a jury trial, of 
manufacturing a controlled substance, to wit, P-2-P, a second 
degree felony, and possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute, to wit, P-2-P, a second degree felony. 
Andre Pommier testified at the hearing to suppress evidence 
that he was a general contractor (see Reporter's Transcript of 
Motions to Suppress, p. 89, January 18, 1989, hereinafter "S"). 
In addition, at the time of the events in this case, he worked 
for the Brigham City Fire Department as an EMT (S 96, 101), as a 
volunteer paid $7.50 per hour (S 96), paid from public funds (S 
100) and had, since October of 1987, during periods while working 
doing carpentry work for Defendant on Defendant's house, been the 
Assistant Fire Marshall (S 100). At the work site, at 
Defendant's house, he wore a beeper, and after October, 1987, 
often carried a police radio to the work site at Defendant's home 
(S 98, 99). As a fireman, Pommier had worked with the police a 
lot of times when they were on scene for traffic control and 
fires (S 117) at various locations. If fact, after the issuance 
of the search warrant, when the police were searching the 
premises pursuant to the search warrant, Mr. Pommier himself was 
at the search site acting in the paid (S 127) capacity of Fire 
Chief (S 124), in charge of the Fire Department involvement in 
the search (S 125). 
Mr. Pommier started working for Defendant in the end of 
January, 1987 (S 90), In the summer of 1987, Mr. Pommier was 
doing various construction work at the home of the defendant (S 
91-92). Mr. Pommier testified that there was as part of 
Defendant's house a locked garage Mr. Pommier had no authority to 
enter (S 104). The windows to the garage had blinds closed on 
them (S 106). In the summer of 1987 Mr. Pommier testified he 
found a key, on a 2x4 on an atrium he was demolishing (S 91), and 
tried it in the lock to the garage. On finding that it worked, 
he took the key, surreptitiously had a duplicate made (S 92), and 
the next day returned the original key to the defendant (107-
108), never telling Defendant that he had made a copy (S 115). 
He then picked a time when the defendant was not present (S 108) 
and broke into the garage. On at least five other occasions, 
ending in March of 1988, he again admitted to having broken into 
the garage of the defendant without any authority to do so, and 
against the expressed and known wishes of the defendant (S 94, 
114) . 
//// 
//// 
A 
Mr. Pommier testified that he never stole anything from the 
premises, nor took anything other than the key from the defendant 
(S 105). He further testified that he took his actions merely 
out of "curiosity" (S 93), and at least at one point was 
concerned about some water that was coming out of the closed 
garage (Si 120). He also testified that he was aware by his 
personal knowledge that the home had, just prior to being 
purchased by the defendant, been owned by Mr. Bob Wendell, who he 
knew for many years was a high school chemistry professor (S 
109) . 
Mr. Pommier testified that on approximately April 22, 1988, 
he quit his employment with the defendant (S 116). He then 
testified that his "guilty conscience" (S 95) got the better of 
him, and in the latter part of June, 1988, went to his co-fireman 
on the Fire Department (S 47-48), Detective Yeates, a Sheriff, to 
tell him of his suspicions and information with regard to what 
was contained in the garage. 
Defendant testified he'd disallowed Mr. Pommier any access 
to the garage, or the house while he was away (S 139), and which 
garage was kept locked. Further, Defendant testified Mr. Pommier 
had been fired from his employment the end of April, 1987, as a 
result of Mr. Pommier stealing money from Defendant's house (S 
140). Defendant told Mr. Pommier that Mr. Douglas might have to 
go to the police about the theft. (S 140). 
Defendant testified Mr. Pommier told him during his 
employment that Mr. Pommier was the Assistant Fire Marshal, and 
at another point, the Acting Fire Marshal (p. 142). Mr. Pommier 
had told Defendant he'd have to leave, and did leave, the 
premises occasionally to make fire inspections (S 142). Mr. 
Pommier normally carried a police radio with him on the job at 
Defendant's house, tuned-in so one could hear the chatter on the 
band (S 142). 
Box Elder County Sheriff Detective Lynn Yeates was called to 
testify. He testified that he and Mr. Pommier were both workers 
on the ambulance, for the Brigham City Fire Department, Ambulance 
(S 77). About June 27, 1988, Mr. Pommier met him on the street 
and told him he thought there was "something wrong" (S 81) up at 
a house in Perry, Utah, Defendant's house. He said at the house 
were containers of ether, chloroform, sodium acetate, sulfuric 
acid, and something else the witness couldn't remember (S 82). 
Detective Yeates took this information to Detective Johnson. 
Deputy Sheriff, Detective Mike Johnson testified that the 
"confidential informant" in the Affidavit Requesting Issuance of 
Search Warrant (Appendix 1-7) was Mr. Pommier. The trial court, 
at the suppression hearing, acknowledged it had before it the 
signed original search warrant, the signed Affidavit aforesaid, 
and the Deposition and Affidavit of Mike Johnson (Appendix 8-10). 
Detective Johnson met with Mr. Pommier on June 29, 1988 (S 47) 
and reviewed a book with pictures of chemical equipment, and Mr. 
Pommier identified some of the items he said he saw in the garage 
(S 40). Later, Mr. Johnson executed the Affidavit and the 
Deposition and Affidavit, and the court executed the Search 
Warrant (Appendix 11-12). The affidavits and search warant were 
signed about September 14, 1988. The search warrant was executed 
on the residence on about September 15, 1988 (Reporter's Trial 
Transcript vol. 1, hereinafter "Rl", p. 55), at which time 
Defendant was taken into custody. 
Detective Yeates was in charge of the evidence seized at the 
home of the defendant pursuant to the search warrant issued by 
Judge Daines (S 10). Detective Yeates testified that there were 
80 to 100 chemicals seized and present at the home (S 15). 
Further, there were greater than a hundred different batches of 
chemicals stored at the defendant's home. Some of these were in 
their original containers, including shipping containers (S 15), 
while others were in unmarked packages (S 15). Detective Yates 
testified that he assisted the D.E.A. chemist (S 11) (Mr. Chuck 
Hall, a forensic chemist with the Drug Engorcement 
Administration), in the taking of samples. He testified that 
they took twelve or thirteen samples among all the chemicals (S 
11). Further, Mr. Hall determined the amount and which chemicals 
were to be sampled (S 17). 
Detective Yates was informed by Chuck Hall that the 
chemicals could constitute a hazard and that all of the items 
should be destroyed (S 12, Rl 124, 90-1). Part of this was 
because of a white powder of unknown substance which was in 
copious quantities and covered much of the interior of the garage 
where the chemicals were found (Rl 102). Based upon that, 
Detective Yeates had all of the chemicals, except for the twelve 
to thirteen samples, destroyed or disposed of (S 12, 13). 
Mr. Chuck Hall was called to testify with regard to the 
chemicals. He is a forensic chemist for the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, having received a bachelors degree in chemistry 
in 1961 (S 22). 7 
Mr. Hall testified that there were over 100 containers of 
different chemicals, some of them still in their original 
containers (S 27). Further, Defendant testified there were 
thousands of items there in the garage where samples were taken 
(Reporter's Transcript of Trial, Volume 2, hereinafter "R2" 495). 
In addition, there were large amounts of chemicals in a storage 
room in the house, but they did not take any samples from said 
storage room. 
Defendant testified at trial his father had been a licensed 
pharmacist (R2 476), that Defendant had a lifelong hobby of 
raising tropical plants (R2 478), fertilized, sprayed, and added 
nutrients to the soil (R2 479). He had a collection of chemicals 
to pursue his chemistry hobby (R2 495). He dabbled in making 
sprays, plant growth hormone, and 20 to 30 other projects (R2 
495). He made solar feed, fertilizer, ammonium phosphate 
compounds, and materials to change p.h. of the soil (R2 500). He 
had worked in the past at jobs where he sold chemicals, and had 
been an officer in a chemical company (R2 499). 
Mr. Hall recommended that they take small parts of "key1* 
chemicals for analysis, and had Detective Yates help him with 
those samples (S 11). His testimony was that those samples were 
approximately 1 ounce in size (S 30). However, no sample was 
taken of the white substance that appeared to cover everything (S 
29) . 
He then testified that all of the chemicals except for the 
samples were potentially hazards, and that they should be 
destroyed. This was notwithstanding the fact that many of them 
were in sealed and original containers, including shipping 
containers, which would pass without objection in interstate 
travel (S 26). Further, with regard to which chemicals were kept 
or sampled, no further bases or foundation or test was testified 
to other than what he deemed might be "key" chemicals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS 
IMPROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AS OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL 
SEARCH AND SIEZURE, BASED ON LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE 
SEARCH WARRANT 
The affidavits supporting the issuance of the search warrant 
stated no percipient evidence of the existence of illegal drugs, 
nor of any activities other than legal ones. False statements 
were made in the affidavits which must be excised, and 
information unrevealed in the affidavit has to be taken into 
consideration. The informant was not reliable, and the warrant 
was based on information overly stale. 
POINT II: 
EVIDENCE DISCOVERED IN THE SEARCH SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BASED 
ON ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SIEZURE SINCE SEARCHING PARTY WAS A 
GOVENMENT EMPLOYEE OR AGENT, OR WAS ACTING IN SUCH A WAY AS 
TO BE DEEMED A GOVERNMENT AGENT 
The informant's actions in breaking into Defendants garage 
six times constituted actions of a government entity or sovereign 
for purposes of search and siezure; first, his Government 
function covered the type of actions and investigations he 
undertook in this case, and, second, he was acting with the state 
of mind and with the type of actions conducive to being deemed to 
be acting as a Governmental agent in connection with the 
investigation. 
POINT III: 
THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE BY THE STATE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT 
OF DUE PROCESS, A FAIR TRIAL, AND OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS 
DEFENSES 
Since the State destroyed a large quantity of chemicals 
after selectively sampling only a few, instead of preserving the 
evidence or sampling all chemicals, it deprived Defendant of 
exonerating evidence in a constitutionally material way, to his 
prejudice before the jury. 
POINT IV: 
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR U.S. ATTORNEY 
GENERAL UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO 
DESIGNATE, RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR 
TRANSFERING SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER 
Utah has forbidden the delegation to others of the 
legislative right to proscribe what drugs shall be controlled 
substances. Furthermore, to delegate to the Congress or the U.S. 
Attorney General the power to create felony crimes, and fix 
punishments therefor, is an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power, and to allow that delegation to occur in the 
future, prospectively, is especially improper. 
POINT V: 
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR U.S. ATTORNEY 
GENERAL UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO 
DESIGNATE, RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR 
TRANSFERING SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS A DEPRIVATION OF 
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO REASONABLE NOTICE OF 
PROSCRIBED CONDUCT 
The method used in the Utah Controlled Substance Act 
purportedly delegating to and enabling the U.S. Attorney General 
to add, delete, and reschedule drugs from the schedules, requires 
a person to constantly review the Federal Register and Code of 
Federal Regulations, and is unduly confusing, and in constant 
flux. As a result, the statute fails to give reasonable notice 
of proscribed conduct to a person of average intelligence. 
POINT VI: 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE THE JURY INSTRUCTION THAT 
THE STATE HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE PROPRIETY OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR SCHEDULING THE TO-BE-CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE 
Defendant requested an instruction to the jury outlining 
that the State had the burden of proving proper compliance with 
administrative requirements on the part of the U.S. Attorney 
General in adding P-2-P to the federal list of controlled 
substances. The denial of the instruction was error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS 
IMPROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AS OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL 
SEARCH AND SIEZURE, BASED ON LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE 
SEARCH WARRANT 
The evidence gathered as a result of the search pursuant to 
the search warrant, chemical samples, appartus, equipment, etc. 
papers, and observations, should be suppressed. There was no 
probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant. This is 
based upon the allegations as set forth in the affidavit, the 
separate and related ground that the false statements contained 
in the affidavit need to be excised, and after they are excised, 
there is clearly not probable cause for the issuance of a search 
warrant, and finally that the evidence is sufficiently stale and 
there is no evidence that it was current, to justify a finding of 
probable cause as of the date of issuance. 
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed and set forth the 
standard with regard to the requirements of affidavits to support 
a search warrant in the case of „Sjtaj^ ^^  732 P.2d 127 
(Utah 1987). The Court stated, at page 130: 
"Search warrant affidavits are to be construed in a 
common-sense, reasonable manner. State v. Williamson, 674 
P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1983); State v. Pursell, 586 P.2d 441 
(Utah 1978). Excessive technical dissection of an 
informant's tip or of the nontechnical language in the 
officer's affidavit is ill-suited to this task. (Illinois 
X^..Gat.es) 462 U.S. at 231-32, 235-36, 103 S.Ct. at 2328-30, 
2330-31. In Gajt.es, the Supreme Court emphasized that an 
informant's "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are but 
two relevant considerations, among others, in determining 
the existence of probable cause under "a totality-of-the-
circumstances." 462 U.S. at 231-32, 235-36, 103 S.Ct. at 
2328-30, 2330-31. They are not strict, independent 
requirements to be "rigidly exacted" in every case. A 
weakness in one or the other is not fatal to the warrant so 
long as in the totality there is substantial basis to find 
probable cause. JjdL at 230, 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 2332. 
The indicia of veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge 
are nonexclusive elements to be evaluated in reaching the 
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances, there is a fair probability that the 
contraband will be found in the place described." 
The United States Supreme Court, as well as the Utah Supreme 
Court, has rejected as hypertechnical the old Ajgu^ 
two-pronged test which required separate and technical 
requirements of showing separately that the informant's tips set 
out the underlying circumstances 1) to reveal the basis of the 
knowledge, and 2) to establish the veracity or reliability. The 
Court thus looks at those issues of basis, knowledge and 
reliability in order to be able to conclude that probable cause 
existed. As stated in JLtaJte^ 675 P. 2d 1203 (Utah 
1984), a case again decided after the rejection of the technical 
requirements of Aguilar-.Spinel 1 i , at page 1205: 
"However, even under this standard, compliance with the 
Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines may be necessary to make a 
sufficient basis for probable cause. Depending on the 
circumstances, a showing of the basis of knowledge and 
veracity or reliability of the person providing the 
information for a warrant may well be necessary to establish 
with a fair "probability" that the evidence sought actually 
exists and can be found where the informant states." 
It is respecfully submitted that that burden cannot be 
established in connection with the affidavit filed herein. As 
noted in the recitation of facts, all of the chemicals possessed, 
as well as chemicals set forth in the affidavit (Appendix 1-7), 
are themselves lawful to possess, and no presumption of 
illegality can occur from their mere possesion. There are two 
attempts to provide probable cause that a crime had been 
committed and there was evidence of a crime at the defendant's 
residence, neither one of which is sufficient, pursuant to 
BaL.ii.ejf, to support a probable cause finding. With regard to the 
statements of the confidential informant, the statement "there is 
a clandestine-type lab producing an illegal substance" is without 
any foundation as to his knowledge or ability to perceive those 
items ("clandestine", "illegal substance"), let alone his ability 
to conclude that that is what is going on. There are no 
statements setting forth that the confidential informant, Mr. 
Pommier, has any experience or knowledge concerning chemistry or 
the manufacture of illegal substances. Thus, there is absolutely 
no basis or foundation showing his knowledge, veracity or 
reliability as to the existence of a clandestine-type lab. 
The other matters as set forth in the affidavit were a 
conversation between Detective Yeates and Art Turkelson, a 
criminologist. Detective Johnson alleges in the affidavit, 
paragraph 16(a), that based upon the description of the equipment 
and glassware, which neither Yeates nor Turkelson had seen, and 
the named chemicals, being four completely legal chemicals, that 
it was "consistent with the type of equipment and chemicals used 
to produce methamphetamine or a substance known as phenyl-2-
propanone." There is nothing, however, to indicate that it is 
inconsistent with any other use, or to in any manner tie the 
defendant in with any illegal activities, let alone drug 
activities. In the affidavit, they allege he does not have a 
license to produce controlled substances, but there is no 
information or belief that he has any history of drug 
involvement, any knowledge or skills concerning production of 
illegal substances, or any desire to. Further, again there is a 
problem with regard to the basis of knowledge and the conclusion 
drawn in that Turkelson is apparently saying that the existence 
of five named chemicals out of many others that are unnamed, and 
equipment which a non-technical trained person has listed and 
described, would be the basis for the reasonable conclusion and 
fair probability that this otherwise respectable citizen, 
innocent, with no further indicia of criminal activity, is 
engaged in the production of a controlled substance. Further, 
there is no way that the possession of the four chemicals listed, 
which are legal to have, could support probable cause to believe 
that controlled substances being produced—otherwise all Chemical 
Companies would of course be subject to search at any time. 
Furthermore, the search warrant authorized the search for illegal 
drugs at a certain home, as well as the person of James Douglas. 
Therefore, looking at the totality of circumstance, there is a 
lack of probable cause; the search warrant was invalid, and the 
evidence must be excluded. 
In addition to the above, there is a problem with regard to 
two direct misstatements in the affidavit, which must be excised 
from the affidavit prior to consideration as to probable cause. 
As noted in Hansen, .id., at page 130, "A warrant may be invalid 
if the supporting affidavit contains a misstatement which 
'materially affects the findings of probable cause.'(Citation 
omitted,)" That is required as a matter of constitutional law if 
there is a false statement, it should be at a minimum excised 
from the warrant. See .State v, Nielsen, 727 P. 2d 188 (Utah 
198 6), and Franks v_j_DeLawar,e, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978). In 
addition, misstatement by omission would also constitute an 
improper action, and the true facts from the admission may be 
required to be read as if in the original affidavit. See State 
JLa_Nielsen, id. at 191. 
Officer Johnson, Officer Yeates, as well as Mr. Pommier, the 
confidential informant, all agreed that when Mr. Pommier came to 
the officers he didn't know what the chemicals were, the purposes 
therefor, or what was going on, but rather that he just had some 
suspicions about it (S 82, 138). Thus, the statement in 
paragraph 4 of the affidavit, that the confidential informant 
"told your affiant of what he believed to be a clandestine-type 
lab producing illegal substances located at the residence in 
Perry" is a direct misstatement. Further, Officer Johnson 
admitted in his testimony that he was unsure as to whether he 
supplied the words "clandestine type lab" or whethem Mr. Pommier 
did (S 137). Therefore, since that is very likely not what Mr. 
Pommier told the officers, because he did not have any basis and 
did not know that, that was a misstatement which was put in 
knowingly, intentionally, and recklessly with regard to its 
truth, and must be excised. See State y. Nielsen, jsu.&r.a, id. 
The second clear misstatement is the statement that the 
chemicals as set forth in the affidavit would produce a 
controlled substance known as phenyl-2-propanone. Phenyl-2-
propanone (P-2-P) is nowhere mentioned in the Utah Controlled 
Substance Act with regard to what are controlled substances, 
although it may be listed in the federal regulations. The Utah 
Supreme Court disallowed delegation in S.t^ te_x.-. Ga.LiiSS/ 57 2 P. 2 
683 (Utah 1977). Had the magistrate known this uncertainty abou 
P-2-P, he may well not have issued the warrant. 
Finally, there is a factual mattter which was well-known to 
the officers and the confidential informant, which was obviously 
intentionally omitted, which should be read in. That fact is 
that although mentioned in paragraph 4 that the residence "known 
to your affiant as the Bob Wendell home", it is not mentioned or 
detailed that Mr. Wendell was, for many years, the high school 
chemistry teacher, and had just recently sold the house and move 
to Arizona. Detective Johnson knew this (S 54). So did Mr. 
Pommier (S 109). Yet it was not revealed to the Magistrate. 
Since it is alleged that the existence of chemicals and chemical 
apparatus is suspicious, the fact that they know the house was 
recently purchased from a chemistry teacher who, one would 
naturally assume, would have substantial chemicals and lab 
equipment stored in his home, would bear on the issue as to the 
suspicious nature of the items. Therefore, that fact should be 
read back into the affidavit. 
Making those changes, we have a situation where an 
individual has seen chemicals, the character of which he has no 
knowledge, and chemistry equipment in a home recently purchased 
from a high school chemistry teacher, but is suspicious, that the 
chemicals and apparatus described are consistent with the 
production of a controlled and an uncontrolled substance, the 
affidavit clearly has a different flavor, meaning, and effect, 
and probable cause evaporates. 
The final concern as to the existence of probable cause has 
to do with the currency of the information set forth in the 
affidavit. The information is too stale to justify any probable 
cause, and the State failed, in its affidavit to set forth the 
matter that the information was timely, current, and that 
probable cause existed at the time of the execution of the 
warrant. 
The warrant in this case was issued Septemeber 14, 1988, and 
served the following day. First, as noted in the affidavit, the 
confidential informant is alleged to have "personally been in the 
residence on numerous occasions between the dates of January, 
1986 and April 22, 1988", the only pertinent times given in the 
Affidavits. See paragraph 7 of affidavit (Appendix, 3). Second, 
the confidential informant is alleged to have first met with the 
officers on June 29, 1988. Although some surveillance occurred 
after the June date (Appendix 3-7) there is no further 
information with regard to any allegation of continuing illegal 
activity, any production of a controlled substance, transporting, 
sales of other chemicals brought into the house, or anything 
else. There is nothing to indicate that to the extent that there 
was any illegal activity going on in April 1988, that it was 
still continuing and on-going in September 1988, when the search 
warrant issued. 
In United .States.J/,_Craig, 674 F Supp 561 (WD La, 1987), it 
is soundly stated that where the affidavit on which the search 
warrant is based describes the offense as having occurred within 
a certain time period but without specifying dates, the court 
reviewing the question of staleness of information must presume 
that the transactions took place in the most remote part of the 
time span, otherwise any ancient evidence could be used by merely 
describing it as falling within a period of time ending with the 
current date. 
Staleness--and the flip-side, the currency of information--
is an essential determination of probable cause. As stated in 
United States^v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331 (4th Cir. 1984), at pages 
1335-6: 
"The Fourth Amendment bars search warrants issued on 
less than probable cause, and there is no question that time 
is a crucial element of probable cause. As valid search 
warrant may issue only upon allegation of "facts so closely 
related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to 
justify a finding of probable cause at that time. Whether 
the proof meets this test must be dtermined by the 
circumstances of each case." Consequently, evidence seized 
pursuant to a warant supported by "stale" probable cause is 
not admissible in a criminal trial to establish the 
defendantf s guilt." 
"Cases in which staleness becomes an issue arise in two 
different contexts. First, the facts alleged in the warrant 
may have been sufficient to establish probable cause when 
the warrant was issued, but the government's delay in 
executing the warrant possibly tainted the search. Second, 
the warrant itself may be suspect because the information on 
which it rested was arguably too old to furnish "present" 
probable cause." 
Further, it would be the State's duty and burden to demonstrate, 
within the four corners of the affidavit, the currency of the 
information. In United Statesy.,Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094 (1st 
Cir. 1979), the case concerned unlawful possession of checks 
stolen from the mail. The affidavit and circumstances of the 
case discussed a receipt of information on October 24, 1976, with 
regard to the checks and purchases thereof. There was then an 
undated specification of a conversation, supposedly with the 
defendant there confirming information of the existence of stolen 
checks and their location in the house. A search warrant issued 
on December 15th, 1976. The Court there held that there was not 
sufficient probable cause based upon the staleness of the 
information. As stated by the Court at page 1096: 
"Without this date (of the conversation), there is no 
way for the Magistrate to determine whether the information 
was sufficiently timely to support the warrant." 
In the present case, there is alleged in the affidavit, whether 
true or not, an over two-year period of when the confidential 
informant was in the property, January 1986 through April 22, 
1988. There is no indication of when the last time he had seen 
those chemicals or the apparatus on the premises. Thus, it would 
be just as reasonable to conclude that he only saw them in 
January 1986 as to him seeing them on April 22, 1988. 
In addition, there was nothing to indicate that in September 
1988 there was nay continued validity to the information. 
It is noted that in S^ ate.„„v„. Hansen, sujDra, the Utah Supreme 
Court said, at 131, "A mere passage of time does not necessarily 
invalidate the supporting basis for the warrant." However, here 
we have no indication of when the items were actually seen in the 
house, and there is no indication of any supporting basis for 
their continuing to be there. Thus, there is more than the mere 
passage of time to destroy the original validity, if any, to the 
information, and it's existence on September 15, 1988. 
Another aspect of the probable cause dilemma is the 
reliability of the informant. In the case at hand, the police 
officers had heard the informant admit to secretly copying a key, 
and breaking in while the owner was away on at least six 
occasions. Most telling, by his story, he did this over the 
course of a year without telling the police. The more credible 
reason for his delay, Officer Johnson should have concluded, was 
to protect the informants surrepticious opportunities. 
The trial court denied Defendants motion to suppress on this 
ground, in its Memorandum Decision (Appendix 36, 37). 
POINT II: 
EVIDENCE DISCOVERED IN THE SEARCH SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BASED 
ON ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SIEZURE SINCE SEARCHING PARTY WAS A 
GOVENMENT EMPLOYEE OR AGENT, OR WAS ACTING IN SUCH A WAY AS 
TO BE DEEMED A GOVERNMENT AGENT 
It is the defendant's position that there are in essence 
three reasons why any evidence obtained as a result of Mr. 
Pommier's entry into the defendant's garage should be disallowed 
as evidence. The first is that Mr. Pommier was a government 
employee or agent when he conducted the searches. The second 
corollary argument is that during those searches he was acting as 
an agent of the government, and therefore the searches also 
trigger the United States Fourth Amendment sanctions as well as 
Article I, Section 14 of the State constitutional provisions. 
Finally, that the illegal actions of Mr. Pommier in and of 
themselves should bar the use of the evidence. 
Mr. Pommier made at least six unauthorized and illegal 
entries into the garage of the defendant. He acted from his 
curiosity, his desire to discover what was inside, his concern as 
to the source of water or other material coming out of the 
garage, as well as his concern and worry about the storage and 
containment of the items found therein, his suspicions as to the 
nature of the circumstances, and finally, for reasons known only 
to him. These correspond with concerns, issues, and functions in 
his official capacity with the Brigham City Fire Department. 
The Utah Supreme Court, as well as federal courts, have held 
that the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, as well as the provisions of Article I, 
Section 14, Utah Constitution, act as M...a restraint only upon 
the activities of sovereign authority and is not applicable to 
the searches and seizures by any persons other than government 
officers and agents." State v._Watts, 750 P. 2d 1219 (Utah 1933) 
at 1221. However, such officers and agents are not limited to 
police officers, but clearly involve other government officials 
and agencies who have a regulatory function. A classic example 
would be a school teacher, whose private search of a student 
triggers Fourth Amendment concerns. 
As the Assistant or Acting Fire Marshall, Mr. Pommier's 
duties would naturally include the investigation and inspection 
of storage facilities to determine whether or not fire hazards 
exist, to seek out various arson possibilities and fires, and to 
perform other regulatory and investigatory functions. His duties 
in inspecting the garage, based upon his curiosity, suspicions, 
and the water leaving, therefore, were in performance of those 
duties. He admitted he understood his duties to include business 
and home inspections. The only alternative explanation, rejected 
by Mr. Pommier, was that he desired to misappropriate things from 
the premises. Further, he is probably within the definitional 
provisions of a special function officer under U.C.A. Section 77-
l(a)-4 (Appendix 13) as a fire arson investigator. Further, 
during his investigations as to the storage of the chemicals in 
the garage, he would be engaged in his duties, therefore a 
special function officer, and therefore, by definition, a peace 
officer. 
It must also be remembered that there were at least six 
entries by Mr. Pommier. Even if one were to give Mr. Pommier and 
the State the- benefit of the doubt as to the first entry, where 
he was concerned about the water, he discovered the water, saw 
various chemicals, did not repair the water (S 120), and left. 
His subsequent entry based upon his suspicions and curiosity--
especially if triggered by the chemicals, would clearly be 
because of his knowledge, expertise and concerns for the 
chemicals, unless the Court believes that he was not truthful 
when he denied a criminal intent to steal. Therefore, assuming a 
proper first entry, the subsequent entries along the line are the 
result of Mr. Pommier acting as a fire marshal 1, or in his 
official capacity as an employee of the State, investigating 
suspicious circumstances and concerns, thereby makin him an agent 
of the State and triggering the warrant requirements. If any of 
those entries is as an agent or employee of a governmental 
entity, the information gained therein and therefrom, including 
the warrant based upon information provided, is improper and the 
fruit of that unlawful search. See State \ri_Jj^ 716 P 2d 
1288 (Idaho 1986), and Wong Sun v. United States, 83 S. Ct. 407 
(1963). 
The second basis for exclusion is that under the 
circumstances of this case, Mr. Pommier was acting as an agent. 
Even though not an actual employee, a private person can be an 
agent for purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution or Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
under certain circumstances. As set forth and discussed in 
Waits, supra, there are two critical areas of inquiry, either one 
of which can turn an otherwise private citizen into an agent for 
purposes of the exclusionary rule. Those are: 1) the 
government's knowledge and acquiescence in intrusive conduct, and 
2) the intent and purpose of the person conducting the search. 
With regard to the knowledge of and acquiescence in test, 
the argument set forth above as to the actuality of his agency as 
a fire marshal 1 and members of the fire department applies here. 
His knowledge, actions, and activity go to the "government's" 
knowledge of an acquiescence in the intrusive conduct. Mr. 
Pommier spent considerable time and effort to gather information, 
committing at least six illegal acts in connection with the 
breaking into the garage. Further, these occurred over a 
lengthy period, and when a dispute arose, he finally called in 
assistance in connection with his fellow fireman, Deputy Yeates. 
Thus, there was sufficient government knowledge and acquiescence 
in the intrusive conduct to warrant application of the 
exclusionary rule. 
It is noteworthy that Mr. Pommier, while working at 
Defendant's home, always wore a beeper for his fire work, and for 
a lengthy period, normally had his dispatch radio with him, 
tuned-in and on. As such, he was always working in a dual 
function. His invasion of Defendant's privacy was precisely the 
type one would expect from a Fire Marshal 1—an inspection. 
The second prong of the test under Watts, is the "intent and 
purpose of the person conducting the search.ff The Utah court 
discussed, with approval, U ni .ted S t. a tes._ v... _ W §l..t h e r , 652 F2d 782 
(9th Cir. 1981). That involved a situation where an airline 
employee searched what he deemed a suspicious "Speed Pak" and 
turned the information over to the DEA. Although it is true that 
the employee had been previously rewarded for such information by 
the DEA, he testified he had no reason to expect to be paid in 
the instant case, nor had he reason not to expect payment. The 
court found this otherwise private airline employee to be an 
agent of the government for purposes of consitutional 
protections. The court stressed three reasons set forth for the 
justification of that conclusion: That the employee opened the 
case because of a suspicion of illegal drugs, there were no 
legitimate business considerations for the actions of the 
employee, and the expectation of potential reward. The court 
therefore concluded, with apparent approval of the Utah court, 
"We are thus satisfied that Rivard (the employee) opened the 
package with the requisite mental state of "an instrument or 
agent. 1" (At 792.) Thus, the state of mind and reason for the 
action of the private individual, when there is any government 
inunlv^ment. is of crucial concern. Further, the court indicates 
that "we also look at the informant's purpose in making the 
search." 
Clearly here, in the absence of an intent to steal, the 
intent was to view the premises, discover contraband, and to 
gather evidence, since the only conclusion possible is that Mr. 
Pommier went back so many times (more than necessary to satisfy 
"curiosity") to investigate what was going on, to discover what 
was in there, going so far as to note or commit to memory the 
names written on various packages that he saw. His state of mind 
was to gather information and evidence, to turn over to the 
appropriate authorities in the Government. Therefore, his 
actions were unreasonable, required a warrant, and therefore any 
evidence found thereby should be suppressed. 
Finally, there is a concern as to the State being allowed to 
use the illegal actions of Mr. Pommier to prosecute an 
individual. We have a situation where the police officers have 
obtained evidnce by illegal means, although such might not have 
been done by them personally. As such, the sense of justice and 
the constitutional rights of due process of law are involved, see 
Stajte y„.. Louden, 387 P. 2d 240 (Utah 1963), and this court, as a 
court of law, justice, and equity, applying the law as it exists 
and exercising supervisory authority over the officers and 
parties before it, should disallow this evidence. 
The trial court denied Defendants motion to suppress on this 
ground, in its Memorandum Decision (Appendix 36, 37). 
POINT III: 
THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE BY THE STATE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT 
OF DUE PROCESS, A FAIR TRIAL, AND OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS 
DEFENSES 
The destruction by the State of all of the chemicals, and 
only taking a non-random sampling of twelve or thirteen of the 
chemicals, when the State is going to attempt to use the 
particular twelve chemicals as sampled as proof that they could 
only have been used for the purposes of producing a controlled 
substance constitute a denial of the defendant's rights to the 
due process of law, and that the evidence of the particular 
chemicals should be suppressed. Finally, the Court at a minimum 
should have disallowed any mention of all of the other chemical 
substances seized and destroyed by the plaintiff without testing 
and analysis as to what those substances were. 
In State. v. Lovato, 702 P. 2d 101 (Utah 1985), the defendant 
was convicted of aggravated sexual assault alleged to have been 
aided by the use of a knife. The knife was lost or thrown away by 
the State and among other grounds, the defendant claimed that 
that denied him his rights. The Court upheld again the doctrine 
that the State's destruction of evidence, under certain 
circumstances, consitutes denial of due process, but held that in 
that case the knife was not sufficiently material, in the 
consitutional sense, to warrant it. The Court in arriving at its 
decision, stated, at page 106: 
"In State..,!, Stewart, Utah 544 P. 2d 477 (1975), we 
said, '[A] deliberate suppression or destruction of evidence 
by those charged with the prosecution, including police 
officers, constitutes a denial of due process .if the 
.eVJLdence is.._ma.ter..ia.l to guilt or innocence of the defendant 
in a criminal case..." JIcL at 479 (Emphasis added.) We 
clarified this proposition in S, t a jt e„ v ..._.N eb e k e r , Utah, 657 
P.2d 1359 (1983), where we said, "The materiality required 
to reverse a criminal conviction for suppression or 
destruction of evidence as a denial of due process is more 
than evidentiary materiality.' JEdL at 1363. Rather, it 
must be ''maJteri,aJLJL&JU^ X<L. 
(emphasis added). Constitutional materiality requires that 
there be a showing that the suppressed or destroyed evidence 
is vital to the issues of whether the defendant is quilty of 
the charge and whether there is a fundamental unfairness 
that requires the Court to set aside the defendant's 
conviction. JEcL A corollary of this proposition is, 'The 
mere p.ossjjbjj^ ijtj; that an item of undisclosed information 
Hliafet have helped the defense, or might have affected the 
outcome of the trial, does not establish "materiality" in 
the constitutional sense.' United States v. Agurs
 f< 427 U.S. 
97, 109-10, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 1 4 ^ ^ 4 ^ 7 1 9 ETTEd.Td 3 42 (1976) 
(emphasis added); .aceor^JNheb^jer, 657 P. 2d at 13 63." 
In State v.,. SMIle.L.,. 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court dealt with another claim of destruction of evidence 
by the State. In that case, the State cremated the victim's 
remains prior to the arrest of the defendant for the death. The 
defendant claimed that that denied him the right to perform tests 
(to see if gunpowedr residue was on the hands of the victim) of a 
possible exculpatory nature. There again, the Supreme Court held 
that the materiality of the evidence was not sufficient in the 
constitutional sense, quoting with approval from „Sta..te v... Lo.vat.O/ 
s.MB..L§....!. 
The court set forth the standard at page 1306 as follows: 
"We agree with the State of Washington that the 
appropriate standard requires the prosecution 'to preserve 
that [evidence] which comes into [the prosecutor's] 
possession either as a tangible object or sense impression, 
if it is reasonably apparent the object or sense impression 
potentially constitute [sic] material evidence.' State v. 
Hall, 22 Wash.App. at 867, 593 P.2d at 558." 
In the case at bar, the State's whole theory of their case 
is a function of what chemicals are together, in what proportion, 
and excluding innocent uses for those chemicals. As such, the 
existence, analysis, and presence of those chemicals is of 
critical and vital importance to the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant. It was clearly understood by the chemists that some 
samples and amounts had to be preserved in order to prove the 
State's case. By the destruction of all other chemicals, it 
denied the defendant the possibility of exculpatory evidence as 
to other chemicals, uses, and combinations of chemicals. This 
was no "mere possibility". Defendant testified at trial 
concerning the specific uses he put the chemicals to, but it was 
of little value, given the enormous prejudicial effect of the 
government's expressed judgment of having destroyed the chemicals 
as "hazardous", even those in their packing containers, and the 
implication that bore on what the government really believed the 
chemicals consisted of. The jury was thereby allowed to 
speculate all the chemicals were intended for contraband and were 
culpable. It is thus material in the constitutional sense. 
Samples should have been taken of all of the chemicals or all of 
the chemicals maintained. Further, the State cannot demonstrate 
any sufficient need for the destruction of all of the chemicals 
without at least taking a sample of them. As testified to by Mr. 
Hall, many household chemicals are far more dangerous and 
hazardous than those that were destroyed (S 31). 
Further, there is no presentation of any systematic, 
logical, or inherently reasonable methodology of the choice of 
the sampling and the choice of the structuring, In the absence 
of, the Court cannot conclude that the officers acted in good 
faith for valid reasons in their nonrandom sampling and their 
intentional destruction of the proposed evidence which they used 
against the defendant, all to the denial of due process rights to 
preservation of evidence. 
In Arizgna^y.^ Younjg.bl.qpd, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988), the police 
had taken swabs and stains with a sexual assault kit from a ten 
year old boy who had been sodomized. Defendant's claim was that 
the State failed to preserve items which could possibly be useful 
as a defense, and failed to do certain investigatory tests which 
might have revealed further information. The State in Youngblood 
kept the evidence, but it was not testable in its final 
conditions. The nature of the destruction and the type of 
evidence involved in this case is different that that of 
Yqungblopd. It is the State's theory in this case that a certain 
group and combination of chemicals sole function and use would be 
illegal. To prove that, they took samples of twelve out of over 
a hundred chemicals, and claimed that all of the chemicals could 
only have an illegal use as shown by the twelve that they 
sampled. The defendant was denied the opportunity to prove what 
the other chemicals were, and that there were other combinations 
and other lawful uses for said chemicals. The State's case was 
one based on circumstantial evidence and the State intentionally 
limited what evidence was available to prove the circumstances to 
what they wanted to be believed. There is a difference between 
the State doing nothing and allowing a medical swab (as in 
Youngblood) to become untestable by the action of nature, and 
affirmative ordering the destruction of evidence, as was done in 
the case at bar. 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Utah has spoken on the issue, 
in connection with the type of evidence herein, and has it's own 
standard and test. Further, these cases note the difference when 
the evidence is of a "material nature in the constitutional 
sense," as opposed to merely "possibly revelant." See S.tat.e vs_.. 
Myat.0..,., 702 P.2nd 101 (Utah 1985). Thus, Utah recognizes the 
different types of evidence as were involved here, and has a 
different test for those, as well as for the State of Utah, than 
is set forth in A r i. z on a _ v s. Xoyng.bI.ogd, s up. r a . 
The trial court denied Defendants motion to suppress on this 
ground, in its Memorandum Decision (Appendix 36, 37). 
POINT IV: 
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR U.S. ATTORNEY 
GENERAL UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO 
DESIGNATE, RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR 
TRANSFERING SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER 
P-2-P is nowhere found or mentioned in the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, Section 58-
37-1 et seq. The term "controlled substance11 is defined in two 
places, Section 58-37-3 and 58-37-2 (4) (Appendix 14-19). The 
only basis that the State can claim that P-2-P is a controlled 
substance is under the theory that it is a controlled substance 
under the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. Section 
801 et seq. P-2-P is not specifically mentioned in the United 
States Code, but, pursuant to rules and regulations of the United 
States Attorney General, and their listing in the Code of Federal 
Regulations at 21 CFR Section 1308.12 (g), it may be a controlled 
substance under the Federal Act. It is the Defendant's position 
that the attempt to define the elements and punishment of a crime 
by reference to the United States Code, or the Code of Federal 
Regulations, promulgated pursuant to administrative rule making 
by the Unites States Attorney General, constitutes an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, and is 
therefore not constitutionally valid and P-2-P is therefore not a 
controlled substance under the Utah Controlled Substances Act. 
It is respectfully submitted that there is a Utah Supreme 
Court case directly on point, State vs„. Gallion 572 P.2d 683 
(Utah 1977). The case involved prosecution of the individual for 
making a forged prescription for a controlled substance, Demerol. 
At that time, Demerol was not a scheduled controlled substance 
under the state statute, but had been scheduled by the Utah 
Attorney General in acccordance with the Controlled Substance 
Act. The Utah Supreme Court held that that was improper, that 
the Attorney General could not so schedule a substance not listed 
in the legislative enactment, and that said action constituted an 
unlawful and illegal delegation of legislative authority under 
both the State and Federal Constitution. The Court held such on 
the basis of two separate but related arguments and concerns. 
The first basis for the holding of the Court is expressed in 
the first half of the opinion in that Article V Section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution prohibits persons in the different branches of 
government from exercising authority over another branch. The 
Utah Attorney General is part of the executive branch and 
therefore a person who was specifically barred from exercising 
legislative authority. Thus, on that ground, as well as the 
second ground, the Supreme Court held it was unconstitutional for 
someone other than the legislature in that case to list a 
controlled substance. 
The Supreme Court however also based its decision on the 
fact that the listing of a controlled substance under the Act, 
thereby defining an element of and the punishment for a crime, 
was an inherently legislative function that could not be 
delegated to anyone. The separate nature of this second point 
was made explicit beginning at page 687 of the opinion, where the 
court stated: 
"The other aspect of this case which merits response is 
whether the Controlled Substance Act has improperly 
delegated legislative power." 
The court held that the definition of a crime was an inherently 
legislative function, which could not be delegated to anyone. 
The court stated, at page 690: 
"A determination of the elements of a crime and the 
appropriate punishment therefore are, under our 
Constitutional system, judgments, which must be made 
exclusively by the legislature." 
The Court discussed the Utah Controlled Substances Act and 
the manner in which it worked, which has not changed 
substantially since that time (with the exception of the 
delegation to the Congress or United States Attorney General, as 
discussed below). The statute has a number of different 
schedules, and defines the seriousness of various offenses 
involving those substances based upon which schedule the 
controlled substance is listed. Thus, what might be a felony to 
deal with a controlled substance under one schedule might be a 
misdemeanor on another. The Court discussed other jurisdictions 
which had similarly held drug statutes unconstitutional and 
distinguished the Federal case law which reached a decision 
contrary to that reached by the Utah Court in Gal lion. In 
arriving at its conclusion and decision, the Court stated at page 
689-90: 
"In the Controlled Substances Act, the administrator 
not only determines that a substance should be controlled, 
he further schedules the substance, which in effect, 
declares the magnitude of the penalty and fixes the 
punishment. The administrator is exercising an essential 
legislative function which cannot be transferred to him..." 
"There are sound reasons for ruling the definition of a 
crime and the precise punishment therefor to be an essential 
legislative function, which cannot be transferred. Criminal 
trials would be unduly complicated, for the defendant would 
have the right to challenge the administrative procedure and 
the findings where a substance has been scheduled or 
rescheduled. A similar determination by the legislature 
could not be challenged. The administrative rulings are not 
statutes and are not incorporated into the code, a person 
who wishes to abide by the law would have to resort to the 
permanent register kept by the secretary of state to 
determine the status of a substance." 
G.ajJJjon involved the Utah State Attorney General . The case 
at bar involves the United States Congress, and pursuant to its 
attempted delegation of authority, the United States Attorney 
General in his adminstrative processes. Therefore, there is no 
way to successfully distinguish the present case from Gjj.H.ion, 
su£.ra/ and therefore the attempted inclusion of P-2-P in the Utah 
Act as a controlled substance is void and without effect as being 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. 
Defendant notes that at least six states' highest appellate 
courts (including Utah) have found their state's enactment of the 
Controlled Substances Act an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power: StaJbjL^^ 379 So.2d 1084 (La. 
1980); Howell v. State, 300 So.2d 774 (Miss. 1974); State v, 
Kre.go, 433 N.E.2d 1298 (Ohio, 1981); State. v., Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 
894 (S.D. 1970); and In Re Powell, 602 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1979). 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found 
that, pertaining to its drug statute, the adoption of future laws 
(see below) of the federal government or its agencies is 
unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of legislative power 
(State v. Grinstead, 206 S.E.2d 912 (W.Va. 1974). 
In Howell, defendant was convicted of the possession of 
amphetamines. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the 
statute which delegated the power to the State Board of Health to 
reschedule drugs was an unconstitutional delegation of the 
legislatures power to define crimes and fix the punishment for 
them, as well as a violation of the State Constitution's 
separation of powers clause. The State Board had transferred 
amphetamines from a Schedule III drug to Schedule II, thus 
increasing the penalties. 
In Krego, an identical opinion resulted from a nearly 
identical rescheduling of the drug phencyclidine, in Ohio. 
In Powell, The Supreme Court of Washington, in reviewing a 
detention for possession of the drug Dalmane, found the 
legislative delegation to the State Board of Pharmacy 
unconstitutional. 
Generally, a state legislature cannot constitutionally 
delegate its legislative powers to Congress or federal agencies. 
Gallion appears to place Utah clearly in the group of states 
prohibiting legislative delegation to Congress or federal 
agencies or officers for the creation of serious crimes, 
specifically. Although there is some conflict, it is generally 
held that the adoption by or under authority of a state statute 
of prospective Federal legislation, or Federal administrative 
rules thereafter to be passed, constitutes an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power. 
A Maine statute declaring "intoxicating", within the meaning 
of the act, any beverage containing a percentage of alcohol which 
by federal enactment or U.S. Supreme Court decision was declared 
to be an intoxicating beverage, was held invalid and an 
abdication of the legislative function, in SJtate. v.. Int?xi.^ 
Liquors, 117 A 588 (Me. 1922). State v. Gauthier, 118 A 380 (Me. 
1922). 
Legislative power was improperly delegated by a provision of 
a state statute setting forth that the maximum periods of labor 
in certain industries should be fixed by the State Department of 
Labor to conform to the schedule established by federal 
authorities, in H o^ga. t .^ B ashore, 200 A 672 (Pa. 
1938). 
I n Da r w eg e r ^ St a at.s , 196 NE 61 (N.Y. 1935), a state 
statute required that agreements, codes, licenses, and rules 
adopted by the Federal Government in pursuance of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act were required to be filed, and, once a 
Code of Fair Competition, as approved by the President of the 
United States, had been filed, the standard of fair competition 
in certain trades and industries would be determined by such 
codes, rules, agreements, and regulations. The court held the 
statute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. 
A state statute imposing a,n ii icoi ne tax equal to one-third of 
the U.S. income tax for which the taxpayer was liable under the 
act of Congress and I.R.S. regulations was held to adopt only the 
act and regulations as they existed at the time of enactment of 
the statute, and not to include future amendments or regulations, 
and was hence not to be an invalid delegation of legislative 
authority, in Santee Mills v. Query, 115 S.E. 20 2 (S.C. 192 2). 
In Dawson_v Hami..l.ton, 314 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1958), a statute 
was passed establishing the standard time in Kentucky to be that 
established by Act of Congress, or order of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. The court held it to be an unconstitutional 
abdication insofar as it "adopts time standards to be fixed in 
the future." (At 536, emphasis in original.) 
A graduate of a foreign medical school applied for licensing 
to practice medicine in Washington. The previous statute allowed 
licensing if the applicant graduated from a school maintaining a 
standard equivalent to those prescribed by the American Medical 
Association. The statute under review required the school to be 
on a list prepared by certain learned medical societies. At the 
time of enactment, the list did not yet exist, but was first 
produced three years after enactment of the statute. This was 
held to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, 
in view of the future actions required at the time of enactment, 
voided the statute. Statev.Urquhart, 310 P.2d 261 (Wash. 
1957) . 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in WaJJ,ac^ 
o.i...„.T.axaJtion, 184 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1971), held that the enactment 
of a statute to the effect that the term "gross income" for state 
income tax returns means adjusted gross income as computed for 
federal income tax purposes did not and could not cause a 
subsequently enacted federal statutory amendment, requiring a 30-
day waiting period before sick pay could be deducted from gross 
income, to have force and effect on state law, since it was an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 
In .S.eaI.e_v„,..„...McKermon, 336 P.2d 340 (Ore. 1959), a statute 
requiring the Oregon State Department of Agriculture to adopt the 
minimum regulations and laws of Unites States Department of 
Agriculture, i.nter aljLa, was interpreted so as to avoid 
unconstitutionality in legislative delegation. Future 
modifications of the federal laws and regulations were deemed not 
to be included in the statute's direction. 
Thus, it is seen that it has been widely held that a 
legislature cannot delegate to Congress or a federal agency power 
to create laws in the future. 
Specifically, in the area of delegating future powers to 
schedule and designate controlled substances, cases consistent 
with the Utah position expressed in Ga.LLi.on are found in ..State y, 
Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 894 (S.D. 1970) and in t^jjte^ v^ . Rodr.!9. uez , 
379 So.2d 1084 (La. 1980), in which cases the state statutes 
specifically included provisions for automatic inclusion of any 
federally scheduled drug, and on that basis, the drug statute was 
found an unconstitutional delegation. In Johnson, the statute 
prohibited sale of any drug which contained any quantity of 
substance designated by regulations promulated under the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Defendant was charged with selling 
LSD, which was not specified on the statute, other than by 
reference to the federal act. The court held, at 895: 
"'Statutes adopting laws or regulations of other 
states, the federal government, or any of its agencies, 
effective at the time of adoption are valid, but attempted 
adoption of future laws, rules or regulations of other 
states, or of the federal government, or of its commission 
and agencies generally have been held unconstitutional as an 
unlawful delegation of legislative power. "' (Citations 
omitted.) 
"The statute does not adopt the regulations of the 
federal government or one of its agencies at a given time, 
but attempts to adopt any and all regulations and changes 
therein promulgated under the federal act .in fujtujro ad 
infinitum. This the legislature could not constitutionally 
do"]'." 
In Rodrigue..?./ supra/ the defendant was charged with 
possession of Talwin. The State Secretary of Department of 
Health and Human Resources, pursuant to statute, added it to the 
list of controlled substances days after the Drug Enforcement 
Agency of the Department of Justice classified Talwin as a 
controlled substance. The court held, at 1087: 
"This prohibition against delegating the power to 
create crimes applies not only to a delegation to a state 
agency, such as the Deprtment of Health and Human Resources, 
but to any other agency or body, such as the Drug 
Enforcement Administration. The Louisiana legislature is 
not authorized to delegate its legislative power to a 
federal agency, nor to Congress." 
Also, .Gri..nstead, s„upra, involved a conviction for 
possession, delivery and sale of the drug LSD. Until 1968, the 
West Virginia legislature had not explicitly outlawed LSD, but in 
1968, Congress amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to include 
LSD. West Virginia's statute defined a "dangerous drug" as one 
described under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 
Thereafter, the State Board of Pharmacy, with reference to the 
federal act, declared LSD a dangerous drug. Subsequent to this, 
Grinstead was indicted. The court held: 
"The Legislature cannot delegate its authority to enact 
criminal laws to an agency which is a unit of the exectutive 
branch of State government, nor can it, under the guise of a 
colorable delegation, permit the Board of Pharmacy to adopt 
a federal law which has not been given prior approval by the 
Legislature," 
The primary objection the G.ofl§iM§atsi court had to the delegation 
was that it was a delegation to the federal government in futuro. 
The Utah Controlled Substances Act went into effect on 
January 1, 1972. Laws 1971, Ch. 145. On March 6, 1979, the 
legislature passed an amendment to the Act, which went into 
effect on May 8, 1979. Laws 1979, Ch. 12. The 1979 amendment 
added the new Subsection (5) to Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, 58-37-2, providing: 
"The words "controlled substance" mean a drug, 
substance or immediate precursor included in I, II, III, IV 
or V or section 58-37-4. "Controlled substance" shall also 
include a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included 
in schedules I, II, III, IV or V of the Federal Contolled 
Substances Act (Title II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules 
may be revised to add, delete or transfer substances from 
one schedule to another, wherther by Congressional enactment 
or by administrative rule of the United States Attorney 
Genral adopeted pursuant to Section 201 of that act. The 
words do not include distilled spirits, wine, or malt 
beverages, as those terms are defined or used in Title 32, 
tobacco or food." 
Similar delegatory language also appears in the 1971 
enactment, at 18(d) and 23. That language has survived nearly 
unchanged in our present 58-37-2(8)(d) aiuJ (16). 
Subsections (2) and (3) of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, 58-37-3, were also added, in 1979: 
"(2) All controlled substances listed in the Federal 
Controlled Substances Act (Title II, P.L. 91-513), as it is 
amended from time to time, are hereby controlled." 
"(3) Whenever any substance is designated, rescheduled 
or deleted as a controlled substance in schedules I, II, 
III, IV or V of the Federal C ontrolled Substances Act (Title 
II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules may be revised by 
Congressional enactment or by administrative rule of the 
United States Attorney General adopted pursuant to section 
201 of that act, that subsequent designation, rescheduling 
or deletion shall govern." 
These subsections survive basically unchanged in our present law. 
P-2-P is not listed in the Utah Controlled Substance Act, 
explicitly. 
The Controlled Subtance Act (21 USCA 801 et seq.) was 
enacted by Congress on October 27, 1970. Section 811 (Appendix 
20-4) sets forth the operative language for exercise of 
delegations to the Attorney General. Subsection (a) and (b) 
provide a means by which the U.S. Attorney General may add, 
transfer between schedules, or remove a drug from schedules. 
First, he must request a scientific and medical evaluation, and 
the Secretary's recommendations, from the Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare (now Health and Human Services). Then he 
must make findings, and follow the federal rulemaking procedure. 
However, 21 USCA 811(e) provides the U.S. Attorney General 
may, with regard to "immediate precursors11, dispense with the 
scientific and medical evaluations, the Secretary's 
recommendations, findings, and the rulemaking procedures 
altogether. Since the requirement of findings is dispensed with, 
the protective factors and guidelines of 21 USCA 811(c) are also 
discarded. 
On December 7, 1979, nine months after the Utah Legislature 
amended Utah Code, Sec. 58-37-2, and 58-37-3, seven months after 
they went into effect, and almost eight years after the initial 
Utah enactment of 58-37-2 (which contained—in Subsection 23--
references to the U.S. Attorney General making findings and 
designations as to precursors), the U.S. Attorney General 
designated P-2-P as a "precursor11, and amended Title 21, Section 
1308.12, to add a new subsection "f", which caused P-2-P, also 
known as phenylacetone, to be included in Schedule II of the 
Federal Act. The effective date of the criminal prohibition was 
even later, February 11, 1980. Federal Register, volume 44, No. 
240, page 71824. (Appendix, 25-27) On May 1, 1986, the Attorney 
General amended by mere renumbering the section 21 CFR 1308.12(f) 
to (g). (Appendix, 28, 29. Appendix 30 shows 21 CFR 1308.12 as 
of the 4-1-79 revision, that is, without the subsection (f)--P-2-
P addition. Appendix 31 and 32 show 21 CFR 1308.12 with the 
addition of (f)--and P-2-P, which is the revision as of 4-1-80.) 
Unquestionably, the Utah Legislature purportedly delegated 
the power to the U.S. Attorney General in May 1979 (or earlier) 
of making future additions to the controlled substance schedules, 
and P-2-P was added by the Attorney General subsequent to the 
delegation by the Utah Legislature, on December 7, 1979, 
effective February 11, 1980. As such, it was a purported 
de 1 egation l.n_Jjitj^  i.BJllilJL\MP, and unconstitutiona 1 . 
Defendant raised these issues pre-trial (Rl 30-45) and at 
the end of the State's evidence, when Defendant moved for a 
directed verdict (R2 425), but they were denied (Rl 45, R2 432-
o j . 
POINT V: 
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR U.S. ATTORNEY 
GENERAL UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO 
DESIGNATE, RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR 
TRANSFERING SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS A DEPRIVATION OF 
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO REASONABLE NOTICE OF 
PROSCRIBED CONDUCT 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Gal lion, observed, at 690: 
"The adminsitrative rulings are not statutes and are not 
incorporated into the code, a person who wishes to abide by 
the law would have to resort to the permanent register kept 
by the secretary of state to determine the status of a 
substance." 
Since the delegation is to the U.S. Attorney General, the burden 
to a person of average intelligence is complicated, by requiring 
that person to follow the very complicated workings of the 
Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations, in addition 
to the Utah statute. A person is not given fair notice that his 
contemplated conduct is prohibited by statute. Defendant, in 
being charged with and convicted of violation of a statute so 
convoluted in its means of providing notice to the world, is 
deprived of due process. A crime so difficult to learn of is in 
a serious sense confusing and vague. Looking to the Utah statute 
for guidance, a person would not find P-2-P, and would only find 
vague words such as "controlled substance". Gxlnsjte.ad, ..ibid, at 
915, and 918, alludes to this problem, but is unclear as to 
whether i t i s a ratj.jo djec.endisj . jSJtjaJbja v^ J.ohns„qn , 17 3 N . W . 2d 
894, at 895, alludes to it, in passing. In . S t a .t e v\ D o u g a, .1.1., 57 0 
P.2d 137 (Wash), at 138, the court concluded: 
"[i]t is unreasonable to expect an average person to 
continually research the Federal Register to adetermine what 
draugs are controlled substances under RCW 69.50." 
His Honor, Judge Low, having heard the evidence, commented on the 
problem (R2 431-2) : 
"I think it's a disconcerting issue. As to notice and 
fairness, I am aware the language in the G.a.LLiori case which 
raises that concern and issue. And I suppose it's most 
bothersome to the court, to the defendant's ability to be 
put on notice of changes in the federal legislation by the 
method prescribed in the federal legislation. And the 
defendant's or any defendant's ability to become aware of 
those kind of changes." 
G.aiJ.1011, at 688, cites the preference in Utah for crimes to 
be stated :i i: 1 the state statutes: 
"In State v. Johnson (44 Utah 18, 26, 137 P. 632 
(1913)) this court held that under the Constitution, the 
courts may not denounce and punish as crimes acts and 
omissions not made punishable by statute, for it is a 
legislative power to declare acts as crimes and to prescribe 
proper penalties." 
"The consititutional standard set forth in State v. 
j[..giinson is incorporated in the Utah Criminal Code. Section 
Y^I'i-iOS, as enacted in 1973, amended 1974, provides:" 
"Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is 
a crime unless made so by this code, other applicable 
statute or ordinance." 
Defendant raised this issue in his motion for directed 
verdict (R2-426), and pre-trial (Rl 30-45), but it was denied (Rl 
45, R2 432-3). 
POINT VI: 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE THE JURY INSTRUCTION THAT 
THE STATE HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE PROPRIETY OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR SCHEDULING THE TO-BE-CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE 
In Ga11ion, at 68 9, the Court held: 
"There are sound reasons for ruling the definition of a 
crime and the precise punishment therefor to be essential 
legislative functions, which cannot be transferred. 
Criminal trials would be unduly complicated, for the 
defendant would have the right to challenge the 
administrative procedure and the findings where a substance 
has been scheduled or rescheduled." 
Defendant tendered Jury Instruction No. 1 to the court 
(Appendix, 33, 34), in compliance with this holding in Gallion. 
It simply set forth the pertinent requirements of 21 USCA 811. 
The court declined to give the instruction, and counsel for 
Defendant stated his objections to the failure (R2 518-9). 
Further, counsel for Defendant objected to the giving of 
Instruction No. 5 (Appendix, 35, R2 521), which implicitly and 
erroneously assumes the premise of what the jury would have been 
required to find, viz. that P-2-P was a controlled substance. 
Nonetheless, the court gave instruction No. 5. As a result, the 
Defendant was denied the right to "challenge the administrative 
procedure and the findings" (GalJJjm, ibi.d. at 689), to his 
serious prejudice. 
j£^j£iJ!i§.iMon 
Therefore, on its face the affidavit in support of the 
warrant does not contain sufficient probable cause to believe 
that the defendant was actively engaged in criminal activity, 
based further upon the fact that certain information should be 
excised and certain added to the warrant, and based upon the 
staleness of the information in the affidavit, the evidence 
gathered should be suppressed. 
Further, the informant in this case, was a government 
employee or agent, or acted with the requisite frame of mind and 
by the requisite means to be treated as acting as a government 
agent, and acted with serious culpable conduct. Therefore, his 
actions should fall under the governance of the Fourth Amendment, 
and, obviously, be suppressed. 
Additionally, due to the destruction of the chemical 
evidence by the State, without full sampling, all chemical 
evidence should have been suppressed, and, at least, the State 
should1ve been barred from alluding to any other chemicals other 
than those few sampled. Due to the prejudice created, directed 
verdict should've been granted. 
Since Utah has already decided that delegations of 
leaislative power to define felony crimes pertaining to 
controlled substances, and to fashion punishments therefore, is 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, and since 
the addition of P-2-P was done after the enactment of the 
statute, the incorporation of P-2-P into the Utah statute was 
unconstitutional, as a delegation, and worse, as a delegation in 
jE.^ .yxo_aLd ij^ iniJtjiOT. 
The convoluted means of incorporating future laws, as was 
used in the purported enactment of the P-2-P inclusion, fails to 
give notice to persons, sufficient to assure their due process 
rights, and as such is vague and confusing. 
The failure of the court to give the instruction on proof of 
proper enactment of the P-2-P scheduling, by the Attorney 
General, deprived Defendant of due process. 
Wherefore, Defendants asks the court to reverse the judgment 
and conviction, and remand for a dismissal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day. Of August ,-> I§89 . 
DANIEL R. KNOWLTON 
Attorney for 
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JON J- BUNDERSON 
BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
45 North First East 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Telephone: (801) 734-9464 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: \ 
THE INVESTIGATION OF AN \ AFFIDAVIT REQUESTING 
ILLEGAL DRUG LABORATORY \ ISSUANCE OF 
\ SEARCH WARRANT 
Criminal No. 
Comes now MIKE JOHNSON, being first duly sworn on his 
oath in this natter, and swears and deposes as follows: 
1. Your affiant is a Peace Officer with fourteen 
(14) years of Law Enforcement experience, currently employed 
by the Box Elder County Sheriff's Office. 
2. Your affiant has worked Drug and Controlled Substance 
Investigations for over five (5) years, during which years 
your affiant has been involved in over one hundred (100) 
drug investigations involving: Illegal Possession of Controlled 
Substances, Illegal Distribution of Controlled Substances, 
Cultivation of Controlled Substances, and Manufacturing 
of Controlled Substances. 
3. Your affiant has been trained in the investigation 
of drug cases as follows: 
Utah P.O.S.T. basic training on Drug Enforcement 
and Identification. 
1-day school on Clandestine Lab Cases, Instruction 
by Utah P.O.S.T. 
3-day school on Clandestine Labs presented by D.E.A. 
1-day school on Clandestine Drug Manufacturing. 
1-week seminar on Drug and Lab Investigations presented 
by the Institute for Law and Justice, Inc. 
2-week national D.E.A. seminar covering most areas 
of Drug Investigations. 
4. On June 29th, 1988, a confidential informant 
(hereinafter referred to as CI) met with your affiant. The 
CI told your affiant of what he believed to be a Clandestine-
type Lab producing an illegal substance located at a residence 
in Perry, Utah, which does not have a street address to 
the knowledge of your affiant. The residence is described 
and known to your affiant as the Bob Wendel Home, located 
across the highway from the Walker Cinema, east of said 
highway approximately one-fourth (J) to one-half ($) mile. 
5. The CI described the area within the residence 
where the lab is located as being in the front earage, 
with various chemicals stored in other parts of the residence. 
The CI further described tubes running to the outside 
of the residence from the front garage area, and the CI 
described various equipment and glassware upon the premises 
as follows: 
a. 
b. 
e 
d. 
e. 
f 
c 
1 
Heating mantles. 
Vessels. 
Flasks. 
Vacuum Pumps. 
Electric Stirrers. 
Filtering Funnels. 
Vacuum Distillation Apparatus. 
Reaction Apparatus. 
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i. Reflex Condensors. 
j. Thermometers. 
6. The CI told your affiant that he had personally 
seen the following chemicals in the residence, 
a. Nitric Acid. 
b. Sulphuric Acid. 
c. Sodium Acetate. 
d. Ether. 
e. Other unnamed chemicals in their containers. 
The CI told your affiant that he read the labels 011 ttlose 
chemicals which, he could name. 
7. The CI told your affiant that he has personally 
been in the residence on numerous occasions, between the 
dates of January, 1986 and April 22, 1988, and his descriptions 
given to the affiant are based upon his personal obser /ations 
while upon the residence premises or within the residence. 
8. The CI told your affiant that the occupant of 
the residence, James Alvin Douglas, diives an International 
make vehicle, which the CI saw was registered to Dodglas1 
girlfriend, who lives in Park City, Utah. 
9 ITif1 CI told your affiant that the residence is 
occupied by a man known to the CI as James Alvin Douglas. 
The CI described the residence location as noted abi»Vf« 
a -lescri--: the premises as consisting of a 
white brick house located in the midst of an orchard in 
Perrj , Utal i, with outbuildings and wi th three (3) German 
Shepherd dogs living upon the premises. 
10. The CI further told your affiant that Douglas 
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told him that the International vehicle used by him (Douglas) 
is specially equipped with a turbocharger and with extra 
gas tanks so that the same can travel approximately twelve 
hundred (1200) miles non-stop. 
11-. The CI told your affiant that the phone number 
on the telephone of the residence was 734-2747. 
12. The CI provided your affiant with a physical 
description of the target, James Alvin Douglas, and described 
his as follows: 5'11", medium to heavy build, balding, 
black hair, black mustache, often wears a western hat. 
13. The CI told your affiant that he smelled a strong, 
chemical smell on August 8th, 1988, while near the residence 
(but not on the premises), and that on an earlier date 
he had smelled the same odor while on the road near the 
premises. 
14. The above information was provided directly 
to the affiant by the CI, or was provided by the CI to 
Detective Lynn Yeates of the Box Elder County Sheriff's 
Office. Detective Yeates has, in turn, provided the information 
he has received to your affiant in the context of the 
joint employment of your affiant and Lynn Yeates with 
the Box Elder County Sheriff's Office. 
15. Your affiant considers the information received 
from the CI to be reliable because the CI is a member 
of the local community in good standing, is known to your 
affiant to be a reliable person, and is believed to be 
assisting law enforcement as a good member of the community 
with no claim for reward or legal favor nor any promise 
-4-
of the same. 
16. Your affiant has verified the above information 
provided by the CI to be correct and accurate through 
the following independent investigation: 
a. Detective Lynn Yeates spoke with Art Terkelson, 
who is a qualified Criminalist at the Weber State Crime 
Laboratory in Ogden, Utah. Yeates described the equipment, 
glassware, and chemicals to Terkelson, and Terkelson stated 
that the type of equipment and glassware present (as described 
herein above) and the named chemicals (described herein 
above) were all consistent with the type of equipment 
and chemicals used to produce Methamphetamine or a substance 
known as Phenyl-2-Propanone-
b. Methamphetamine and Phenyl-2-Propanone are 
controlled substances under the Utah Controlled Substances 
Act, and your affiant is informed and believes that it 
is illegal to produce or possess the same without the 
proper licenses. 
c. Your affiant has spoken with Kim Kail of 
the Utah Narcotics and Liquor Law Enforcement Division 
and is informed that upon investigation, James Alvin Douglas 
does not possess a license from the State of Utah which 
would allow him to either possess or produce Methamphetamine 
or Phenyl-2-Propanone. 
d. Your affiant has personally travelled to 
the residence, without entering the private property, 
and examining merely what is available to see from the 
public roadway, has discovered the home to be a white 
brick house, surrounded bv an ^T-^K^^-^ T^^^^^J ~- * %. -
approximate location described by the CI* Your affiant 
observed three (3) German Shepherd dogs upon the premises. 
e. Your affiant nas conducted surveillance 
of the premises, without entering the premises, and has 
seen a male individual leave and/or return to the premises. 
This male individual fits the description given by the 
CI of the person known as James Alvin Douglas, to wit, 
the individual is approximately 5 feet 11 inches, has 
a medium to heavy build, is balding, has black hair, and 
a black mustache. 
f. Lynn Yeates has told your affiant that he 
has seen the said male individual and has noted that he 
was wearing a western hat during his surveillance of the 
premises• 
g. Your affiant has personally observed, through 
surveillance, an International make vehicle driven by 
the male occupant of the premises, bearing License Plate 
Number Utah, 309 BHJ. Upon checking this License Number 
with the Utah Motor Vehicle Division, your affiant discovered 
that the same is registered to one Sharon L. Carbine< 
Box 19 64, Park City, Utah-. 
h. Your affiant has observed a female driving 
another vehicle, License Plate Number 807 CBE, said vehicle 
also registered to the same Sharon L. Carbine at P.O. 
Box 1864, Park City, Utah. This female has been observed, 
through surveillance, leaving and/or travelling to the 
above described premises, and has been observed to stay 
there overnight on at least one occasion. 
i. Through surveillance, your affiant and Detective 
Sergeant Ken Adams followed Douglas and the female 
described above, who is believed to be Sharon L. Carbine, 
and in a public parking lot your affiant and Sgt. Adams 
walked by the International vehicle driven by the target. 
Your affiant observed, without the aid of artificial illumination 
or other artificial means, that the said International 
vehicle is equipped with what appears to be auxiliary 
gas tanks. This occurred on July 28th, 1988. 
k. Your affiant is aware from his training, 
and is also informed by Art Terkelson, that the manufacture 
of Phenyl-2-Propanone and Methamphetamine creates a strong 
odor, and that Phenyl-2-Propanone is a precursor of Methamphetamine 
in the said manufacturing process. 
17. All observations resulting from surveillance 
noted herein occurred between the dates of June 29th, 
1988 and September 1st, 1988. 
DATED this day of September , 1988. 
MIKE JOHNSON, AFFIANT 
NOTARY SEAL: 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of 
September _, 1988. 
ROBERT W. DAINES, CIRCUIT JUDGE 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) DEPOSITION AND AFFIDAVIT 
) ss OF MIKE JOHNSON IN SUPPORT 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER ) OF AND PETITION FOR 
SEARCH WARRANT 
Personally appeared before me this day of September, 
1988, the deponent and affiant herein, MIKE JOHNSON, a peace 
officer, who, on oath, deposes and says that he has and there 
is probable and reasonable cause to believe, and that he does 
believe, that there is now (on the premises) (in the vehicle) 
(on the person of) located at and also described as: 
The premises known as the Bob Wendel Home, located in Perry, Utah, 
across the highway from the Walker Cinema, east of said highway 
approximately one-fourth (i) to one-half (\) of a mile, 
consisting of a wnite brick house located in the midst of an 
orchard, with various out-buildings and three (3) German 
Shepherd dogs living upon the premises; a vehicle described 
as an International, bearing License Plate Number 309 BHJ, Utah; 
the person of an individual known as JAMES ALVIN DOUGLAS; 
the following personal property or evidence, to wit: 
Illegal drugs, including particularly Phenyl-2-Propanone or 
Methamphetamine, chemicals and equipment used to manufacture 
Phenyl-2-Propanone and/or Methamphetamine, including but not 
limited to tubes, equipment, glassware, heating mantels, vessels, 
flasks, vacuum pumps, electric stirrers, filtering funnels, 
vacuum distilation apparatus, reaction apparatus, reflex condensors 
thermometers, and various chemicals, including but not limited 
to Nitric Acid, Sulphuric Acid, Sodium Acetate, Ether, and 
other unnamed chemicals in their containers. 
Your deponent and affiant says that there is probable 
and reasonable cause to believe that the said property 
or evidence: 
(X) is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed. 
(X) has been used as a means of committing a public offense. 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense. 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party 
to the illegal conduct. 
Your affiant says chat the tacts in support of the issuance of the 
search warrant are as follows: AS SPECIFIED IN THE AFFIDAVIT REQUESTING 
ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HERBQ 
?«qqyxxgj5^KK?twxxteeoxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxgW'Xifflac^aKKX 
XXXXXXXJraXKy^XM^l^-X^XkKXKSteXayXOCiX^XiCjKXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
3^XK?KMKXX«Xt<XXX>^XK*X*tfXK#*^ 
3£&*X9S«XXXttC«X&i^X»}tXX 
QtXXXKX3tfgXdfcXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX9CXXXXX?«XaC^ff8a^XjCXXXX 
xxKxjgcxjodfc&^Xxto^ 
feeiHXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XYYXYXYYyyyyyXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XYXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
4«x*^^xxaaa*xK}at^KJ»wxK8Beofixx9tKxxicKMxxKJ«^ 
&^Xl<$K)iX^*^X^ii^w^XSet^A^i>t^XK^-X.-XXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
Your affiant has reasonable cause to believe that grounds for the 
issuance of a search warrant exist, based upon the aforementioned information, 
facts and circumstances. 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the 
seizure of said items in the daytime and that the same be brought before this 
magistrate. 
XXXBK^XXXK^XXXtMXXK^ 
XXXK&XXXX^XXXX^^XX^XKX^^KX^ 
XKX^^XKt^XXX&S^X>2i^^ 
It is further requested that, if appropriate, the officer executing the 
requested warrant not be required to give notice of his authority or purpose 
because: 
( ) This paragraph is not appropriate to this case and such authority 
is not requested. 
(x) The property sought is a narcotic, illegal drug, or other similar 
substance which may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed 
of. 
( ) Physical harm may result to a person if such notice is given 
because: 
MIKE JOHNSON 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of September ,19 
Judge, ROBERT W. DAINES 
In the FIRST CIRCUIT Court of 
Box Elder County, State of Utah. 
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' t - IRST CIRCUIT M'IIII I ]" bRIGHAM C3TY 
COX El DER COUNTY, r,TATF, OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF BOX, ELDER 
. - . - ^ - - -* :'hE STATE CF UTAH TO: any s h e r i f f , i n s t a b l e , - 2 - s h a l , 
- - o 1 V r - n r r . " -. • • • .***-*•»•» -% *. ^ p p "* f f : ** '• r ' "n ' ' * r . ' " o f p^y p 1 , \
 L ^ ; 
I ; - o f , \j . i t f i J a \ . " : . - . , • - n _ J . V .. u. Lt Core mu uy MIKE 
JCHNSON * "h ve JS probable ar d reasonable cause for 
the i s suance of the search waf'iP.L as s e t for>h ] n 'he a f f : d a * t t a t tached 
h e r e t o and made a p a r t hereof as i f f u l l y s e t fo r th h e r e i n ; you a r e , t h e r e f o r e , 
comroanded to made immediate .search ( in the daytime) XXK>a^XXX3feXJiXXSf-^ xaX9C 
XKXX^XX>^K^X«X^^ (of the preir-iscs) ( in a veh ic l e ) 
(on the person of) l o c a t e d a t and a l s o desc r ibed a s : 7he p r e m i s e s known 
a s t h e Sob Wende l Home, l o c a t e d i n P e r r y , U t a h , a c r o s s t h e h i g h w a y 
f rom t h e W a l k e r C i n e m a , e a s t o f s a i d h i g h w a y a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e - f o u r t h 
t o o n e - h a l f (J) m i l e , c o n s i s t i n g o f a w h i t e b r i c k h o u s e l o c a t e d i n 
Lhii^j^lAsl^^l^^ri^^JiJiQhArd
 t w i t h v a r i o u s o u t - b u i l d i n g s and t h r e e (3) 
German S h e p h e r d d o g s l i v i n g upon t h e p r e m i s e s ; a v e h i c l e d e s c r i b e d 
Sii-aJ? I n t e r n a t i o n a l , b e a r i n g L i c e n s e P l a t e Number 3 0 9 5HJ , U t a h ; 
t h e p e r s o n of an i n d i v i d u a l known as JAMES ALVTN DOUGLAS; 
the fo l lowing pe r sona l proper ly or ev idence , t c - w i t : I l l e g a l d r u g s , i n c l u d i n g 
p a r L i c u l a r l y P h e n y l - 2 - P r o p a n o n e o r M e t h a m p h e t a m i n e , cTTemicals and 
e q u i p m e n t u s e d t o m a n u f a c t u r e P h e n y l - 2 - P r o p a n o n e a n d / o r M e t h a m p h e t a m i n e 
i n c l u d i n g b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o t u b e s , e q u i p m e n t , g l a s s w a r e , h e a t i n g m a n t e 
v e s s e l s , f l a s k s , vacuum pumps , e l e c t r i c s t i r r e r s , f i l t e r i n g f u n n e l s , 
vacuum d i s t i l a t i o n a p p a r a t u s , r e a c t i o n a p p a r a t u s , r e f l e x c o n d e n s e r s , 
t h e r m o m e t e r s , a n d v a r i o u s c h e m i c a l s , i n c l u d i n g b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o 
N i t r i c A c i d , S u l p h u r i c A c i d , Sod ium A c e t a t e , E t h e r , and o t h e r unnamed 
c h e n j i c a l s a n t h e i r c o n t a i n e r s , « ^ „ ,, „ 
and i ? you f ind the same or any p a r t t h e r e o f , X^J^XX^XXXXaS^XIKftXSXKtaf 
X0CXt!4XXX :^t*XXX>iXl$XX«XXlXK«0fiX^ ( t o r e t a i n and keep i t s a f e ly \ inti ] f u r t h e r 
o rde r of the c o u r t ) . 
uivcn ui'dt'i riM, hand and dated t h i s day of S e p t e m b e r ,, 1988 . 
JUDGE , ROBERT W. DAINES 
Proof" under oath ! laving been presented to the satisf action of tl ic 
magistrate that the foregoing search warrant which has been issued, is 
for a narcotic or illegal drug or otf icr similar substance wliich may be 
easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of, or that physical harm 
may result to any person if notice is given, you are hereby authorized to 
execute this search warrant without first luiocking or in any way disclosing 
yourself, your authority, or your purpose. 
J! JDGE , RC 'BE? .T i i E ? INES 
PAGE 2 — Search Warrant 
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^ 'Special function officers ' means persons performing specialized inves-
tigations, service of legal process, or security functions. These officers include 
state military police, constables, port of entry officers, school district security 
officers, fire arson investigators for any political subdivision of the state, 
airport security officers of any airport owned or operated by the state or any of 
its political subdivisions, railroad special agents deputized by a county sheriff 
under Section 17-30-2, and all other persons designated hv <tnu^>> -v: u a v - -
peace officer authority. 
(2) (a) Special function officers have peace officer aurr.'-r/,;. while en 
gaged in the duties of their respective employment, and not ior the pur 
pose of general law enforcement. Where the officer is charged with secu-
rity functions respecting facilities or property, the powers may be exer-
cised only in connection with acts occurring on the property where the 
officer is employed or when required for the protection of the employ* - '-
interest, property, or employees. 
(b) Airport security officers have total peace officer authority w;..-r 
duty and when acting in relation to the responsibilities of the airport ,it 
which they are employed, providing that the powers may be exercise i 
only in connection with acts occurring on the property of the airport 
(c) Special function officers may carry firearms only if authorized and 
under conditions as specified by the officer's employer or chief administra-
tor. The carrying of firearms by constables is authorized onh »vrnje fl-
are engaged in the duties of their employment. 
(3) fa) A special function officer may not exercise the authority of a pea<.e 
<\r until the officer has satisfactorily completed an approved basic 
i-j.umng program for special function officers as provided under Subsec-
tion *3Kb) and the chief law enforcement officer or administrator h. 
certified this fact to the director of the Division of Peace Officer Standard 
and Training. City and county constables and their deputies shall cert \: 
their completion of training to the county commissioner of *u^ roujv 
they serve. 
(b) The agency [that] the special function officer serves shah establiMi 
and maintain a basic special function course and in-service training pro-
grams as approved by the director of the Division of Peace Officer Stan-
dards and Training with the advice and consent of the Council on Peace 
Officer Standards and Training. The training shall consist of MO fewer 
than 40 hours per year, to be conducted by the agency's own atai: or .•; N-r 
agencies. 
History: C. 1953, 77-la-4, enac ted by L. 
1985, ch. 174, § 3; 1987, ch. 203, § 2. 
Compiler ' s Notes. — The 1987 amendment 
inserted "port of entry officers" and substituted 
"Section 17-30-2" for "Section 17-22-2" in the 
second sentence in Subsection (1); designated 
the formerly undesignated paragraph in Sub-
section (2) as Subsection (2Kb), redesignating 
former Subsection (2Kb) as present Subsection 
(2Hc); inserted "the Division of" preceding 
"Peace Officer Standards and Training" in 
Subsections (3Ha) and <3)(b); and made minor-
stylistic changes throughout the section. 
Laws 1987, ch. 203, § 3 provides: "It is un-
derstood that a normal transition period shall 
be allowed to effect the transfers (of the opera-
tion of ports of entry to the highway patrol |." 
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• r .met'. • ^i.uact as deimeo ,.i :JU • oae of ethics adopted and pub-
lished by h*' National Association of S«.» in! Wnrtnrc 
H*sue~\. i >"• . . *».* - ' • mil. < i it-ii uinicni social worker" and "or as a 
32, § 6; 1985, ch. 187, & 78; 1987, eh. 27, § 9. member of any other health care profession" in 
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1987 amend- Subsection (3), inserted '•1-'" !n Subsection 
ment substituted "licensee" for "person" in the (4), and made other n,,i,ui uianges. 
first sentence in the introductory paragraph, 
CHAPTER 37 
CONTROLLED SIT I«* ' \N<T^ 
Sunset Act. 
1997. 
Section f»3-~ - : | l . ' i "lie ~)8 is terminated on .1 * *  1, 
iSrt-.'iT-'J.S. Practices of non-allopathic practi-
tioners, herbalists, and mas-
sage therapists and use of herbs 
and food supplements of vegeta-
ble origin not restricted. 
58-37-4. Schedules of controlled sub-
stances — Schedules I through 
V — Findings required — Spe-
cific substances included in 
schedules, 
58-37-6. License to manufacture, produce, 
distribute, dispense, adminis-
ter, or conduct research — Issu-
Section 
58-37-8. 
58-37-9. 
58-37-10. 
5 8 
58 37 
ance by department — Denial, 
suspension, or revocation — 
Records required — Prescrip-
tions. 
Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
Investigators -— Status of peace 
officers. 
Search warrants —- Administra-
tive inspection warrants — In-
spections and seizures of prop-
erty without warrant. 
Property subject to forfeiture -
Seizure — Procedure. 
. I n . t . . -
58.37-1. Mill1 .;,,.-.*M*><i Subs t ances Act." 
COLLA FERAL INFERENCES 
A.L.R. — When may offender found guilty of 
multiple crimes under Comprehensive Y) un 
Abuse Prevenlion and Control Ait of 1970 eji 
KSCS ^ 841-851) be punished for nir.l, .»iw 
fense M) A L.R. Fed. 794. 
-f-
58-37-2. Definitions. 
As used in. this chapter: 
(1) "Administer" means the direct application ^\ A -^orr^iien sub-
stance, whether hy injection, inhalation, m^esti.-u. •* s i* --'her n c m s , to 
the body of a patient or research subject b\ 
(a) a practitioner or, in his presence, by his authorized agent; or 
(b) the patient or research subject at the direction and in the pres-
ence of the practitioner, 
(2) "Agent" means an authorized person who ,nr. > -..* ->i'or at the 
direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or practit; .••**, r.oes not in-
clude a common or contract earner, ouhi- ^arehou.-oman or employee of 
any of them. 
(3) "Control" means to add, remove, or change the placement of a drug, 
substance, or immediate precursor under Section. 58-37-3, 
239 
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(4) v uu. • • e means a drug, substance, or immediate pre-
cursor include'. -es I, II, III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4, and also 
includes a drug substance, or unrnediate precursor included in schedules 
I, II, III, IV, or V of the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L 
91-513, as those schedules may be revised to add, delete, or transfer sub-
stances from one schedule to another, wl lether by Congressional enact-
ment or by administrative1 n tit> of the IJnited States Attorney General 
adopted under Section 201 of that act. Controlled substance does not 
include distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as those terms are de 
fined or used in Title 32A, regarding tobacco or food, 
( 5 ) '' ( ! t » i i 1 1 1 1 * i" 11 • 11. i 1111»i: ; 111111 * t% in < * a 11 s: 
(a) aily substance or container or labeling of any substance that 
without authorization bears the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, number, device, or any likeness of them, 
of a manufactureir, distributor, or dispenser other than the person or 
persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, or dispensed the sub-
stance which falsely purports to be a controlled substance distributed 
by, any other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or 
(b) any substance that is represented to be a controlled substance 
(6) "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, constructive, or attempted 
transfer of a controlled substance or a listed chemical, whether or not an 
agency relationship exists 
(7) "Department" means the Department of Commerce. 
(8.) "Depressant or stimulant substance" means: 
la) a drug which contains any quantity of 
(i) barbituric acid or any of the salts ot Darn 
(ii) any derivative of barbituric acid which ho 
nated by the secretary as habit-forming under Sectic 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Aft .21 r ^ 
(b) a drug which contains any quantity o! 
(i) amphetamine or any of its optica) isomers; 
(ii) any salt of amphetamine or anv salt of an ov\ • i' -
amphetamine; or 
(iii) any substance which tl le Secretary ot n 
Services or the Attorney General of the Unite 
vestigation has found and by regulation designated habi; 
ing because of its stimulant <;ffect on the ^ n t r n i *-.,.-.•-.->-• ^ ^ 
or 
(c) lysergic acid diethylamide; 
(d) i111y (J i*u g w h i c h con ta ins any q u a i 11 i ty < > i ; i s u bs ta nce wh i c h the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services or the Attorney General of 
the United States after investigation has found to have, and by regu-
lation designated as having, a potential for abuse because of its de-
pressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system or its 
hallucinogenic effect. 
(9) "Dispense" or "prescribe" means the delivery of a controlled sub-
stance by a pharmacist to an ultimate user pursuant to the lawful order of 
a practitioner, and includes distributing to, leaving with, giving away, or 
it posing of that substance as well as the packaging, labeling, or com-
pel inding nen \ssarv t n nnMV»r*» t h.» - • - Kstanee for de 1 ivery. 
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 t. ..3i:naci , -A I.> dispenses a controlled sub-
stance. 
(11) "Distribute" means to deliver oiher than i»v administering or dis-
pensing a controlled substance or a listed chemical 
(12) "Distributor" means a person who .':-;* -••v^ s' 
stances. 
(13) "Drug" means: 
(a) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia,, 
Official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or Official 
National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; 
(b) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease m man or other animals; 
(c) articles, other than food, intended to afTVt 'he struct1.;*-* 
function of man or other animals and 
(d) articles intended for use as a comi; rant oi any . * -pen 
fied in Subsection (a), (b), or (c); but dn.^ - f -icludt- i • *] >••* 
mmponents, parts, or accessories 
5 Drug dependent person" means ai ly individual who unlawfully 
md habitually uses any controlled substance to endanger the public 
*
w
*~als, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so dependent upon the use of 
•rolled substances as to have lost the power of self-control with refer 
-nee to his dependency. 
(151 "Food" means: 
m* ,mv nutrient or substance of plant, mineral. .: ^.wina* origin 
Than a drug as specified in this chapter, and normally ingested 
.;man beings; and 
(hi foods for special dietary uses as exist by reason of a physical, 
physiological, pathological, or other condition including but not lim-
ited to the conditions of disease, convalescence, pregnancy, lactation, 
allergy, hypersensitivity to food, underweight, and overweight; uses 
for supplying a particular dietary need which exist by reason of age 
ncluding but not limited to the ages of infancy and childbirth, and 
also uses for supplementing and for fortifying the ordinary or un-
lsual diet with any vitamin, mineral, or other dietary property for 
^e of a food. Any particular use of a food is a special dietarv H ^ 
regardless of the nutritional purposes. 
' 16' "Immediate precursor" means a substance which the 
OTipral of the United States has found to be, and by regulnti* 
a ted as being, the principal compound used or produced < 
-e in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or which it> *. 
ite chemical intermediary used or likely to be used in the manui 
. controlled substance, the control of which is necessary to prevent > m -
L or limit the manufacture of the controlled substance. 
'Manufacture" means the production, preparation, propagation, 
unaing, or processing of a controlled substance, either directly or 
cti\ by extraction from substances of natural origin, or indepen-
iciitiv by means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction 
md chemical synthesis. 
•IS) "Manufacturer" includes any person who packages, repackages, or 
labels anv -^  nt;nner of any controlled suhManre. ox^opt pharmacists who 
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dispense or compound prescription orders for delivery to the ultimate 
consumer. 
(19) "Marijuana" means all species of the genus Cannabis and all parts 
of the genus, whether growing or not; the seeds of it; the resin extracted 
from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, deriv-
ative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin. The term 
does not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the 
stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound, 
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature 
stalks, except the resin extracted from them, fiber, oil or cake, or the 
sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of germination. Any syn-
thetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant Cannabis sa-
tiva or any other species of the genus Cannabis which are chemically 
indistinguishable and pharmacologically active are also included. 
(20) "Money" means officially issued coin and currency of the United 
States or any foreign country. 
(21) "Narcotic drug" means any of the following, whether produced 
directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or 
independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of 
extraction and chemical synthesis: 
(a) opium, coca leaves, and opiates; 
(b) a compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation of 
opium, coca leaves, or opiates; 
(c) opium poppy and poppy straw; or 
(d) a substance, and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, 
or preparation of the substance, which is chemically identical with 
any of the substances referred to in Subsection (a), (b), or (c), except 
narcotic drug does not include decocainized coca leaves or extracts of 
coca leaves which do not contain cocaine or ecgonine. 
(22) "Negotiable instrument" means documents, containing an uncon-
ditional promise to pay a sum of money, which are legally transferable to 
another party by endorsement or delivery. 
(23) "Opiate" means any drug or other substance having an addiction-
forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine or being 
capable of conversion into a drug having addiction-forming or addiction-
sustaining liability. 
(24) "Opium poppy" means the plant of the species Papaver somnif-
erum L., except the seeds of the plant. 
(25) "Person" means any corporation, association, partnership, trust, 
other institution or entity or one or more individuals. 
(26) "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds, of the opium 
poppy, after mowing. 
(27) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, 
control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, obtaining, 
or the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as 
distinguished from distribution, of controlled substances and includes in-
dividual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances. For a 
person to be a possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not re-
quired that he be shown to have individually possessed, used, or con-
trolled the substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that he jointly 
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participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of 
any substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring. 
(28) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veterinarian, pharma-
cist, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, 
registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct re-
search with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis 
a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in 
this state. 
(29) "Proceeds" means whatever is received when an object is sold, 
exchanged, or otherwise disposed of. 
(30) "Production" means the manufacture, planting, cultivation, grow-
ing, or harvesting of a controlled substance. 
(31) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds, notes, or other evidences of 
debt or of property. 
(32) "State" means Utah. 
(33) "Ultimate user" means any person who lawfully possesses a con-
trolled substance for his own use, for the use of a member of his house-
hold, or for administration to an animal owned by him or a member of his 
household. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 2; 1977, ch. 29, 
§ 3; 1979, ch. 12, § 1; 1981, ch. 75, § 1; 1982, 
ch. 12, § 1; 1987, ch. 190, § 1; 1989, ch. 50, 
§ 1; 1989, ch. 186, § 1; 1989, ch. 225, § 60. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment alphabetized the definitions and renum-
bered the subsections accordingly; in Subsec-
tion (5), designated the existing language as 
Subsection (a), added Subsection (b), and, in 
Subsection (a), deleted "controlled" preceding 
the first two instances of "substance" and sub-
stituted "falsely purports to be a controlled 
substance" for "thereby falsely purports or is 
represented to be the product of, or to have 
been"; deleted a definition of "Distribute for 
value" contained in former Subsection (8); de-
leted "far" preceding "dependent" in Subsec-
tion (14); deleted the former undesignated 
paragraph at the end of this section, which 
read "This act does not infringe upon the rights 
of citizens to purchase and use herbs and food 
supplements of vegetable origin and does not 
restrict the non-allopathic practitioners, the 
herbalist, the massage therapists"; and made 
minor changes in phraseology throughout the 
section. 
Distribution. 
The evidence was sufficient to support a con-
viction for distribution of a controlled sub-
stance where the defendant, who was ap-
proached with a request to sell marijuana to a 
police officer, agreed, quoted the selling price, 
The 1989 amendment by Chapter 225, effec-
tive March 14, 1989, substituted "Department 
of Commerce" for "Department of Business 
Regulation" in Subsection (7) and "Health and 
Human Services" for "Health, Education and 
Welfare" in Subsections (8)(b)(iii) and (8)(d). 
The 19&9 amendment by Chapter 186, effec-
tive April 1, 1989, inserted "or a listed chemi-
cal" in Subsections (6) and (11) and corrected a 
typographical error in Subsection (8). 
The 1989 amendment by Chapter 50, effec-
tive April 24, 1989, substituted "species of the 
genus Cannabis and all parts of the genus" for 
"parts of the plant cannabis sativa L." near the 
beginning of the first sentence and inserted "or 
any other species of the genus Cannabis" in the 
last sentence of Subsection (19) and made a 
stylistic change in Subsection (33). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Federal law. — The federal Controlled Sub-
stances Act, cited in Subsection (4), is codified 
as 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. Section 201 of the 
Act is 21 U.S.C. § 811. 
and then personally delivered the contraband 
and received the money at his apartment; he 
did not merely find, direct, and introduce the 
offker to another drug dealer. State v. F\xe\, 
744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987). 
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(27) to (30); and designated former Subsection 
(27) as the last paragraph. 
ANALYSIS 
Delivery. 
Distribution. 
Incomplete sale. 
"Production." 
Delivery. 
The definition for delivery makes it clear 
that agency is not to be considered in finding 
criminal culpability under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act. State v. Casias, 567 P.2d 1097 
(Utah 1977). 
Distribution. 
There was no distribution by the defendant 
where an undercover police.agent gave mari-
juana to the defendant. State v. Soroushirn, 
571 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1977). 
Incomplete sale. 
Where defendant agreed to sell cocaine to an 
undercover agent, and the parties then pro-
ceeded, with the cocaine, to another location in 
order that the agent could obtain money for the 
purchase, a distribution of cocaine for value did 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 25 Am. Jur . 2d Drugs, Nar-
cotics, and Poisons § 7 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 72 C.J.S. Poisons § 1. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 3; 1979, ch. 12, 
§ 2. 
Meaning of " this act" . — See the note un-
der the same cauhlme following $ 58-37-1. 
not take place, although the evidence was suf-
ficient to support a conviction for the lesser 
ofYense of attempt to distribute a controlled 
»- substance. State v. Devlin, 699 P.2d 717 (Utah 
 1985). 
"Production." 
The cooking and adding of chemicals to the 
^ marijuana plant in an effort to produce "hash," 
" a more potent and concentrated form of mari-
l
' juana, was sufficient to indicate defendants in-
tended to engage in the processing of a con-
trolled substance directly or indirectly by ex-
a traction from substances of natural origin and 
>- to sustain a conviction for possession with in-
 tent to produce or manufacture a controlled 
substance. State v. Horsley, 596 P.2d 661 
(Utah 1979>. 
Key Number s . — Drugs and Narcotics <£=» 
42; Poisons <£= 2. 
58-37-3. Substances which are controlled — Revised fed-
eral schedules govern. 
(1) All controlled substances listed in § 58-37-4 are hereby controlled. 
(2) All controlled substances listed in the Federal Controlled Substances 
Act (Title II, P.L. 91-513), as it is amended from time to time, are hereby 
controlled. 
(3) Whenever any substance is designated, rescheduled or deleted as a con-
trolled substance in schedules I, II, III, IV or V of the Federal Controlled 
Substances Act (Title II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules may be revised by 
Congressional enactment or by administrative rule of the United States At-
torney General adopted pursuant to § 201 of that act, that subsequent desig-
nation, rescheduling or deletion shall govern. 
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bis plant; consequently, in prosecution for pos-
session of marijuana, prosecution need not prove 
that substance found in defendant's possession 
consisted of proscribed portions of Cannabis 
plant. United States v Span (1975. CA10 Kan) 
515 F2d 579. 
To extent hashish contains THC it is con-
trolled substance under 21 USCS §802(15). 
United States v Kelly (1976, CA9 Idaho) 527 
F2d 961. 
District Court did not err in instructing jury-
that 21 USCS § 802(15), which defines marijuana 
as plant cannabis sativa L. comprehends other 
forms of plant and prohibits possession of all 
varieties of marijuana. United States v Gagnon 
(1980. CA10 Okla) 635 F2d 766, cert den 451 
US 1018, 69 L Ed 2d 390. 101 S Ct 3008. 
21 USCS §802(15) outlaws all species of 
marijuana containing tetrahydrocannabinol. 
United States v Lupo (CA7 Wis) 652 F2d 723, 
cert den 457 US 1135, 73 L Ed 2d 1353, 102 S 
Ct 2964). 
Congress intended inclusion of indicia variety 
within definition of marijuana. United States v 
Moore (1970, ED Pa) 330 F Supp 684, affd 
(CA3 Pa) 446 F2d 448, cert den 406 US 909. 31 
L Ed 2d 820, 92 S Ct 1617. 
8. "Narcotic drug" 
Definition of "narcotic drugs*' as used in 
predecessor to this section included cocaine. 
Lastra Padilla v United States (1960. CA5 Fla) 
278 F2d 188. 
Legislative history of 21 USCS § 802(15) indi-
cates definition of marijuana was intended to 
only include those parts of marijuana which 
contain tetrahydrocannabinol. Thomas v United 
States (1976, Dist Col App) 352 A2d 390. 
Definition of marijuana as Cannabis sativa 
within meaning of 21 USCS §802(15) includes 
all Cannabis, even though Cannabis sativa is 
only one of several species of marijuana. People 
v Riddle (1975) 65 Mich App 433, 237 NW2d 
491. 
Percodan tablets containing one per cent of 
"dihydrohydroxycodeinone hydrochloride" com-
monly called codeinone, were narcotics within 
meaning of predecessor to this section. Rivas v 
United States (1966, CA9 Cal) 368 F2d 703, cert 
den 386 US 945, 17 L Ed 2d 875, 87 S Ct 980 
and (disagreed with United States v Himmel-
wright (CA5 Fla) 551 F2d 991, cert den 434 US 
902, 54 L Ed 2d 189, 98 S Ct 298). 
Congress has perogative to classify cocaine, 
which is non-narcotic central nervous system 
stimulent, as narcotic for penalty and regulatory 
purposes. United States v Stieren (1979, CA8 
Iowa) 608 F2d 1135. 
Combined effect of statutory definitions of 
"dispense" and "practitioner" is to limit mean-
ing of "dispense" to delivery of controlled sub-
stances by physician acting in course of profes-
sional practice or research; delivery of controlled 
substances outside course of professional practice 
or research constitutes "distributing", which vio-
lates 21 USCS § 841(a)(1), even if carried on by 
registered physician. United States v Badia 
(1973. CA1 Mass) 490 F2d 296 (disagreed with 
United States v Genser (CA10 Colo) 710 F2d 
1426). 
Although statutory definition of "narcotic 
drug" is broader than dictionary definition. Con-
gress need not follow latter in applying term to 
number of different classes of drugs for purposes 
of legal control: classification of cocaine within 
definition of "narcotic drug" under 21 USCS 
§802(16) is not arbitrary and irrational. United 
States v Di Laura (1974, DC Mass) 394 F Supp 
770. 
9. "Practitioner" 
"Osteopathic physicians" in Kansas were not 
"physicians." Burke v Kansas State Osteopathic 
Asso, Inc. (1940, CA10 Kan) 111 F2d 250. 
Doctor who acts other than in course of 
professional practice is not practitioner under 
Controlled Substance Act and is therefore not 
authorized to prescribe controlled substances and 
is subject to criminal provisions of act. United 
States v Rosenberg (1975, CA9 Cal) 515 F2d 
190, 33 ALR Fed 196, cert den 423 US 1031, 46 
L Ed 2d 404, 96 S Ct 562 and (disagreed with 
United States v Genser (CalO Colo) 710 F2d 
1426). 
Osteopath was "physician." Hostetler v Wood-
worth (1928, DC Mich) 28 F2d 1003. 
10. "Ultimate user" 
Term "ultimate user" includes person who has 
obtained drug for his own use; it does not 
require that he in fact use it therefor. United 
States v Bartee (1973, CA10 Colo) 479 F2d 484. 
11. "United States" 
Suitcase containing cocaine which had been 
abandoned on luggage carousel at Miami Airport 
had been imported into "United States" within 
meaning of 21 USCS §802(26). United States v 
Catano (1977, CA5 Fla) 553 F2d 497, 2 Fed 
Rules Evid Serv 73, cert den 434 US 865, 54 L 
Ed 2d 140, 98 S Ct 199. 
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§ 803. [Repealed] 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
This section (Act Oct. 27, 1970, P. L. 91-513, Title II, Part A, § 103, 
84 Stat. 1245) was repealed by Act Oct. 18, 1977, P. L. 95-137. § 1(b), 
91 Stat. 1169. This section authorized the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs to add 300 agents and necessary supporting person-
nel. 
AUTHORITY TO CONTROL; STANDARDS AND SCHEDULES 
§ 811. Authority and criteria for classification of substances 
(a) Rules and regulations of Attorney General; hearing. The Attorney 
General shall apply the provisions of this title to the controlled substances 
listed in the schedules established by section 202 of this title [21 USCS 
§812] and to any other drug or other substance added to such schedules 
under this title. Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e), the Attorney 
General may by rule— 
(1) add to such a schedule or transfer between such schedules any drug 
or other substance if he— 
(A) finds that such drug or other substance has a potential for abuse, 
and 
(B) makes with respect to such drug or other substance the findings 
prescribed by subsection (b) of section 202 [21 USCS § 812(b)] for the 
schedule in which such drug is to be placed; or 
(2) remove any drug or other substance from the schedules if he finds 
that the drug or other substance does not meet the requirements for 
inclusion in any schedule. 
Rules of the Attorney General under this subsection shall be made on the 
record after opportunity for a hearing pursuant to the rulemaking proce-
dures prescribed by subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5 of the United 
States Code [5 USCS §§551 et seq.]. Proceedings for the issuance, 
amendment, or repeal of such rules may be initiated by the Attorney 
General (1) on his own motion, (2) at the request of the Secretary, or (3) 
on the petition of any interested party. 
(b) Evaluation of drugs and other substances. The Attorney General shall, 
before initiating proceedings under subsection (a) to control a drug or 
other substance or to remove a drug or other substance entirely from the 
schedules, and after gathering the necessary data, request from the Secre-
tary a scientific and medical evaluation, and his recommendations, as to 
whether such drug or other substance should be so controlled or removed 
as a controlled substance. In making such evaluation and recommenda-
tions, the Secretary shall consider the factors listed in paragraphs (2), (3), 
(6), (7), and (8) of subsection (c) and any scientific or medical considera-
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tions involved in paragraphs (1), (4), and (5) of such subsection. The 
recommendations of the Secretary shall include recommendations with 
respect to the appropriate schedule, if any, under which such drug or other 
substance should be listed. The evaluation and the recommendations of the 
Secretary shall be made in writing and submitted to the Attorney General 
within a reasonable time. The recommendations of the Secretary to the 
Attorney General shall be binding on the Attorney General as to such 
scientific and medical matters, and if the Secretary recommends that a 
drug or other substance not be controlled, the Attorney General shall not 
control the drug or other substance. If the Attorney General determines 
that these facts and all other relevant data constitute substantial evidence 
of potential for abuse such as to warrant control or substantial evidence 
that the drug or other substance should be removed entirely from the 
schedules, he shall initiate proceedings for control or removal, as the case 
may be, under subsection (a). 
(c) Factors determinative of control or removal from schedules. In making 
any finding under subsection (a) of this section or under subsection (b) of 
section 202 [21 USCS § 812(b)], the Attorney General shall consider the 
following factors with respect to each drug or other substance proposed to 
be controlled or removed from the schedules: 
(1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse. 
(2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known. 
(3) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other 
substance. 
(4) Its history and current pattern of abuse. 
(5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse. 
(6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health. 
(7) Its psychic or physiological dependence liability. 
(8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance 
already controlled under this title. 
(d) International treaties, conventions, and protocols requiring control; 
procedures respecting changes in drug schedules of Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances. (1) If control is required by United States 
obligations under international treaties, conventions, or protocols in 
effect on the effective date of this part, the Attorney General shall issue 
an order controlling such drug under the schedule he deems most 
appropriate to carry out such obligations, without regard to the findings 
required by subsection (a) of this section or section 202(b) [21 USCS 
§ 812(b)] and without regard to the procedures prescribed by subsections 
(a) and (b) of this section. 
(2)(A) Whenever the Secretary of State receives notification from the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations that information has been 
transmitted by or to the World Health Organization, pursuant to 
article 2 of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which may 
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justify adding a drug or other substance to one of the schedules of the 
Convention, transferring a drug or substance from one schedule to 
another, or deleting it from the schedules, the Secretary of State shall 
immediately transmit the notice to the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services] who 
shall publish it in the Federal Register and provide opportunity to 
interested persons to submit to him comments respecting the scientific 
and medical evaluations which he is to prepare respecting such drug 
or substance. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare 
[Secretary of Health and Human Services] shall prepare for transmis-
sion through the Secretary of State to the World Health Organization 
such medical and scientific evaluations as may be appropriate regard-
ing the possible action that could be proposed by the World Health 
Organization respecting the drug or substance with respect to which a 
notice was transmitted under this subparagraph. 
(B) Whenever the Secretary of State receives information that the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations proposes to 
decide whether to add a drug or other substance to one of the 
schedules of the Convention, transfer a drug or substance from one 
schedule to another, or delete it from the schedules, the Secretary of 
State shall transmit timely notice to the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services] of such 
information who shall publish a summary of such information in the 
Federal Register and provide opportunity to interested persons to 
submit to him comments respecting the recommendation which he is 
to furnish, pursuant to this subparagraph, respecting such proposal. 
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health 
and Human Services] shall evaluate the proposal and furnish a 
recommendation to the Secretary of State which shall be binding on 
the representative of the United States in discussions and negotiations 
relating to the proposal. 
(3) When the United States receives notification of a scheduling decision 
pursuant to article 2 of the Convention of Psychotropic Substances that 
a drug or other substance has been added or transferred to a schedule 
specified in the notification or receives notification (referred to in this 
subsection as a "schedule notice") that existing legal controls applicable 
under this title to a drug or substance and the controls required by the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 USCS §§ 301 et seq.] do not 
meet the requirements of the schedule of the Convention in which such 
drug or substance has been placed, the Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services], after consulta-
tion with the Attorney General, shall first determine whether existing 
legal controls under this title applicable to the drug or substance and the 
controls required by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 
USCS §§ 301 et seq.], meet the requirements of the schedule specified in 
the notification or schedule notice and shall take the following action: 
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(A) If such requirements are met by such existing controls but the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and 
Human Services] nonetheless believes that more stringent controls 
should be applied to the drug or substance, the Secretary shall 
recommend to the Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for 
scheduling the drug or substance, pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) 
of this section, to apply to such controls. 
(B) If such requirements are not met by such existing controls and 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health 
and Human Services] concurs in the scheduling decision or schedule 
notice transmitted by the notification, the Secretary shall recommend 
to the Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for scheduling 
the drug or substance under the appropriate schedule pursuant to 
subsections (a) and (b) of this section. 
(C) If such requirements are not met by such existing controls and 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health 
and Human Services] does not concur in the scheduling decision or 
schedule notice transmitted by the notification, the Secretary shall— 
(i) if he deems that additional controls are necessary to protect the 
public health and safety, recommend to the Attorney General that 
he initiate proceedings for scheduling the drug or substance pursu-
ant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section, to apply such 
additional controls; 
(ii) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified 
acceptance, within the period specified in the Convention, pursuant 
to paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention, to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations; 
(iii) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified 
acceptance as prescribed in clause (ii) and request the Secretary of 
State to ask for a review by the Economic and Social Council of 
the United Nations, in accordance with paragraph 8 of article 2 of 
the Convention, of the scheduling decision; or 
(iv) in the case of a schedule notice, request the Secretary of State 
to take appropriate action under the Convention to initiate pro-
ceedings to remove the drug or substance from the schedules under 
the Convention or to transfer the drug or substance to a schedule 
under the Convention different from the one specified in the 
schedule notice. 
(4)(A) If the Attorney General determines, after consultation with the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and 
Human Services], that proceedings initiated under recommendations 
made under paragraph [subparagraph] (B) or (C)(i) of paragraph (3) 
will not be completed within the time period required by paragraph 7 
of article 2 of the Convention, the Attorney General, after consulta-
tion with the Secretary and after providing interested persons oppor-
tunity to submit comments respecting the requirements of the tempo-
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rary order to be issued under this sentence, shall issue a temporary 
order controlling the drug or substance under schedule IV or V, 
whichever is most appropriate to carry out the minimum United 
States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. 
As a part of such order, the Attorney General shall, after consultation 
with the Secretary, except such drug or substance from the applica-
tion of any provision of part C of this title [21 USCS §§ 821 et seq.] 
which he finds is not required to carry out the United States 
obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. In the 
case of proceedings initiated under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3), 
the Attorney General, concurrently with the issuance of such order, 
shall request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified 
acceptance to the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant 
to paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. A temporary order 
issued under this subparagraph controlling a drug or other substance 
subject to proceedings initiated under subsections (a) and (b) of this 
section shall expire upon the effective date of the application to the 
drug or substance of the controls resulting from such proceedings. 
(B) After a notice of qualified acceptance of a scheduling decision 
with respect to a drug or other substance is transmitted to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with clause (ii) 
or (iii) of paragraph (3)(C) or after a request has been made under 
clause (iv) of such paragraph with respect to a drug or substance 
described in a schedule notice, the Attorney General, after consulta-
tion with the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary 
of Health and Human Services] and after providing interested persons 
opportunity to submit comments respecting the requirements of the 
order to be issued under this sentence, shall issue an order controlling 
the drug or substance under schedule IV or V, whichever is most 
appropriate to carry out the minimum United States obligations under 
paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention in the case of a drug or 
substance for which a notice of qualified acceptance was transmitted 
or whichever the Attorney General determines is appropriate in the 
case of a drug or substance described in a schedule notice. As a part 
of such order, the Attorney General shall, after consultation with the 
Secretary, except such drug or substance from the application of any 
provision of part C of this title [21 USCS §§821 et seq.] which he 
finds is not required to carry out the United States obligations under 
paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. If, as a result of a review 
under paragraph 8 of article 2 of the Convention of the scheduling 
decision with respect to which a notice of qualified acceptance was 
transmitted in accordance with clause (ii) or (iii) of paragraph 
( 3 ) ( Q -
(i) the decision is reversed, and 
(ii) the drug or substance subject to such decision is not required to 
be controlled under schedule IV or V to carry out the minimum 
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United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the 
Convention, 
the order issued under this subparagraph with respect to such drug or 
substance shall expire upon receipt by the United States of the review 
decision If, as a result of action taken pursuant to action initiated 
under a request transmitted under clause (iv) of paragraph (3)(C), the 
drug or substance with respect to which such action was taken is not 
required to be controlled under schedule IV or V, the order issued 
under this paragraph with respect to such drug or substance shall 
expire upon receipt by the United States of a notice of the action 
taken with respect to such drug or substance under the Convention 
(C) An order issued under subparagraph (A) or (B) mav be issued 
without regard to the findings required by subsection (a) of this 
section or by section 202(b) [21 USCS § 812(b)] and without regard to 
the procedures prescribed by subsection (a) or (b) of this section 
(5) Nothing in the amendments made by the Psychotropic Substances 
Act of 1978, or the regulations or orders promulgated thereunder shall 
be construed to preclude requests by the Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services] or the Attorney 
General through the Secretary of State, pursuant to article 2 or other 
applicable provisions of the Convention, for review of scheduling deci-
sions under such Convention, based on new or additional information 
(e) Immediate precursors. The Attorney General mav, without regard to 
the findings required by subsection (a) of this section or section 202(b) [21 
USCS § 812(b)] and without regard to the procedures prescribed by 
subsections (a) and (b) of this section, place an immediate precursor in the 
same schedule in which the controlled substance of which it is .an 
immediate precursor is placed or in any other schedule with a higher 
numerical designation If the Attorney General designates a substance as 
an immediate precursor and places it in a schedule, other substances shall 
not be placed in a schedule solely because they are its precursors 
(0 Abuse potential. If, at the time a new-drug application is submitted to 
the Secretary for any drug having a stimulant, depressant, or hallucino-
genic effect on the central nervous system, it appears that such drug has an 
abuse potential, such information shall be forwarded by the Secretary to 
the Attorney General 
(g) Non-narcotic substances sold over the counter without a prescription; 
dextromethorphan. (1) The Attorney General shall by regulation exclude 
any nonnarcotic substance from a schedule if such substance may, under 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 USCS §§ 301 et seq ], be 
lawfully sold over the counter without a prescription 
(2) Dextromethorphan shall not be deemed to be included in any 
schedule by reason of enactment of this title unless controlled after the 
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date of such enactment [enacted Oct 27, 1970] pursuant to the forego-
ing provisions of this section 
(Oct 27, 1970, P L 91-513, Title II, Part B, §201, 84 Stat 1245, Nov 
10, 1978, P L 95-633, Title I, § 102(a), 92 Stat 3769) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
References in text: 
"This title ', referred to in this section, is Title II of Act Oct 27, 1970, 
P L 91 513, 84 Stat 1242, which appears generally as 21 USCS 
§§ 801 et seq For full classification of such Title, consult USCS Tables 
volumes 
"The effective date of this part", referred to in this section, is Oct 27, 
1970 which is the effective date of Part B of Title II of Act Oct 27, 
1970. P L 91-M3, as provided by § 704(b) of such Act, which appears 
as 21 USCS ^ 801 note "Schedule IV or V", referred to in this section, 
appears in 21 USCS § 812(c) 
"The Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978" referred to in this section, 
is Act Nov 10, 1978, P L 95 633 <>2 Stat 3768 which amended this 
section, among other things for full classification of this Act, consult 
USCS Tables volumes 
Explanatory notes: 
The bracketed words "Secretary of Health and Human Services" are 
inserted on authontv of Act Oct 17, 1979 P L 96-88, Title V, § 509, 
93 Stat 695 which appears as 20 USCS § 3508, and which redesig-
nated the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare as the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services and provided that any reference to the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, in any law in force on the 
effective date of such Act Oct 17, 1979, shall be deemed to refer and 
applv to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, except to the 
extent such reference is to a function or office transferred to the 
Secretary of Education or the Department of Education under such 
Act Oct 17 1979 
The bracketed word "subparagraph" is inserted in subsec (d)(4)(A) of 
this section as the word probably intended by Congress 
Effective date of section: 
Act Oct 27, 1970, P L 91-513, Title II, Part G. § 704(b), 84 Stat 
1284, which appears as 21 USCS § 801 note, provided that this section 
is effective upon enactment on Oct 27 1970 
Amendments: 
1978. Act Nov 10, 1978, in subsec (d), designated the existing 
provisions as para (1), and added paras (2)-(5) 
Other provisions: 
Effective date of 1978 amendment. Act Nov 10, 1978, P L 95-633, 
Title I, § 112, 92 Stat 3774, which appears as 21 USCS § 801a note, 
provided that the amendment of this section shall take effect on the 
date the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, signed at Vienna, 
Austria on February 21, 1971, enters into force in respect to the United 
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"Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, this subtitle [adding 21 USCS §971 and 
note and notes to § 801. and amending this section and 21 USCS §§ 830. 841, 842, 872, 
876, 881, 960, 961] shall take effect 120 days after the enactment of this Act.". 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
Federal Procedure L Ed: 
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics. Fed Proc, L Ed §§ 35:665, 35:669. 
Forms: 
15 Federal Procedural Forms L Ed, Statutes of Limitation, and Other Time Limits § 61:32. 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
7. "Marijuana" Weight of marijuana plant stalks will not be 
For purposes of 21 USCS § 801, et seq., man- considered for purposes of sentence enhancement 
juana is "controlled substance." United States v under 21 USCS § 841(b)(1)(A) (vii), where mari-
One 1977 36 Foot Cigarette Ocean Racer (1985, juana was seized at stage before it was turned into 
SD Fla) 624 F Supp 290. readily marketable and consumable product and 
Conviction for possession with intent to distrib- where 21 USCS § 802(16) excludes stalks from 
ute "quantity of hashish, substance containing definition of marijuana, because under "market 
tetrahydrocannabinol" will not be overturned, de- approach" adopted by Congress in legislative his-
spite defendants' argument that evidence was in-
 t o r y enhanced penalties should only applv when 
sufficient to prove that what they possessed was
 a l l marijuana seized is marketable, and such inter-
controlled substance, and that variance between
 p r e t a t i o n a V o i d s inequity of penalizing individual 
description of charge or drug possessed in indict
 w U h u n m a r k e t a b l e marijuana same as individual 
ment and jury instructions and proof of charge or ^
 s a m e a m o u n t o f m a r k e t a b l e m a r i jUana. 
drug assessed presented at tnal requires acquittal,
 M i „ e r ( , 9 g £ D T ^ p 
because (1) even though actual seized substance o r c iiR9 
chemical analysis thereof was never adduced at u p p 
trial, testimony by evidence technician who issued 8. "Narcotic drug" 
substance to undercover agents who sold it to
 I n determining whether certain substance was 
defendants by police officer present with drug dog
 i a t e d e r i v a t i v e drug enforcement agency admin-
at scene of arrest and by forensic chemist who
 i s t r a t o r u n d e f 2 , u s c s § 8 0 2 C Q n s i d e r t h e 
gave definitions of hashish and sea-hash was
 s u b s t a n c e . s p h a r r a a c o l o g i c a , e f f c c t s a s a s p e c t o f 
sufficient to show beyond reasonable doubt that . _ . . / „ . . . ,, . j • •
 4 » > 
substance seized from defendants was illegal "de- d e f i n , t , o n ° f d T j T e ; . and administrator s r e -
rivative of marijuana" under 21 USCS §§812, jection o f 2-step definition of derivative ,n which 
802(16), and (2) defects in indictment and jury u , s s a i d t h a [ substance is derivative of another 
instructions which mistakenly characterized hash- o n l y , f , l c a n be produced from it in only one or 2 
ish seized as "substance containing THC" instead chemical operations, is sufficiently reasonable and 
of "derivative of marijuana" neither confused jury consistent with the act's purposes to warrant judi-
nor affected any substantial right of defendants so cial deference, particularly considering the admin-
as to require upset of conviction under 21 USCS istrator's expertise in area. Reckitt & Colman, Ltd. 
§ 841(a)(1) United States v McMahon (1987, DC v Administrator, Drug Enforcement Admin. 
Me) 673 F Supp 8. (1986, App DC) 788 F2d 22. 
§ 811 . Authority and cri ter ia for classification of substances 
(a)-(f) [Unchanged] 
(g) Non-narcotic substances sold over the counter without a prescription; dextromethorphan.! 
(1), (2) [Unchanged] I 
(3) The Attorney Genera l may, by regulation, exempt any compound, mixture, or l 
preparation containing a controlled substance from the application of all or any part on 
this title if he finds such compound, mixture, or preparation meets the requirements o l 
one of the following categories: I 
(A) A mixture, or preparat ion containing a nonnarcotic controlled substance, which! 
mixture or preparat ion is approved for prescription use, and which contains one orl 
more other active ingredients which are not listed in any schedule and which are! 
included therein in such combinations, quantity, proportion, or concentration as to! 
vitiate the potential for abuse. I 
(B) A compound, mixture , or preparation which contains any controlled substance! 
which is not for administrat ion to a human being or animal, and which is packaged in 
such form or concentrat ion, or with adulterants or denaturants, so that as packaged if 
does not present any significant potential for abuse. I 
(h) Temporary scheduling of substance in schedule I to avoid imminent public safety hazard} 
( I ) If the Attorney Genera l finds that the scheduling of a substance in schedule I [21 
USCS § 812] on a temporary basis is necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the publiJ 
safety, he may, by order and without regard to the requirements of subsection (b) relatinl 
to the Secretary of Heal th and H u m a n Services, schedule such substance in schedule I [ 2 | 
USCS § 812] if the substance is not listed in any other schedule in section 202 [21 
§ 812] or if no exemption or approval is in effect for the substance under section 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 USCS § 355]. Such an order may 
issued before the expiration of thirty days from— 
(A) the date of the publication by the At torney General of a notice in the I 
Register of the intention to issue such order and the grounds upon which such o 
to be issued, and 
(B) the date the Attorney General has t ransmit ted the notice required by par; 
(4). 
(2) The scheduling of a substance under this subsection shall expire at the end of or 
from the date of the issuance of the order scheduling such substance, except th 
Attorney General may, during the pendency of proceedings under subsection (a)(l 
respect to the substance, extend the temporary scheduling for up to six months. 
(3) When issuing an order under paragraph (1), the At torney General shall be requi 
consider, with respect to the finding of an imminent hazard to the public safety 
those factors set forth in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) of subsection (c), including 
abuse, diversion from legitimate channels, and clandestine importation, manufactu 
distribution. 
(4) The Attorney General shall t ransmit notice of an order proposed to be issued 
paragraph (1) to the Secretary of Health and H u m a n Services. In issuing an order 
paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall take into consideration any comments si 
ted by the Secretary in response to a notice t ransmit ted pursuant to this paragraph. 
(5) An order issued under paragraph (1) with respect to a substance shall be vacated 
the conclusion of a subsequent rulemaking proceeding initiated under subsection (a] 
respect to such substance. 
(6) An order issued under paragraph (1) is not subject to judicial review. 
(As amended Oct. 12, 1984, P. L. 98-473, Title II , Ch V, Par t B, § 509(a), 98 Stat. 2072 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
1984. Act Oct. 12, 1984, in subsec. (g) added para. (3); and added subsec. (h). 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
Federal Procedure L Ed: 
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics, Fed Proc. L Ed §§ 35:513, 35:540-545, 35:547-548, 35:629. 
Am Jur: 
2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 395. 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
6. Judicial review quired to respond to petition for such a rul< 
1 Constitutionality t o ' n ^ o r r n petitioner that petition will nc 
' 21 USCS § 811(h) is permissible delegation of ^ , c e P t e d J f * " * ™lc f a l , s o u A t s j d e s c ? J * f j 
congressional power and iTnot so arbitrary that it 2 s e n v j?!"* E 7 n f ° r C e m e n t A d m , n - ° 9 8 5 ' i 
does not comport with due process, since tempo- ' 2 
rary scheduling criteria are as specific as reason- Previous delegation of permanent schedulir 
ably practicable to meet imminent threat to public Attorney General to Administrator of DEA 
safety while providing sufficient guidance, absence not delegate power to schedule drugs tempoi 
of notice and public comment is permissible where under 21 USCS § 811(h), since procedure and 
temporary scheduling is emergency measure last- of Administrator in temporary scheduling i 
ing at most 18 months, lengthy public comment most entirely different than permanent sched 
would jeopardize public safety, and public hearings under § 811(a), and failure of Congress or A 
are held for consideration of permanent schedul- ney General to challenge or correct Admini 
ing, constitutionally imposed requirement of judi- tor's actions, or tacit approval of those actior 
cial review would invalidate many statutes which not substitute for express delegation of authc 
preclude judicial review, harsh punishment of United States v Emerson (1988, CA9 Cal) 846 
those distributing temporarily scheduled sub- 541. 
stances is not irrational means of reducing hazard, Guidelines under 21 USCS §811(h) are s 
and determination of imminent threat to safety
 d e n t | y p r e c j s e f o r d e | e gation of legislative p< 
without scientific evaluation is reasonable basis for
 t o A t t o r n e y G e n e r a , t o temporarily add substa 
temporarily scheduling substances. United States v
 t 0 S c h e d u l e i o f Controlled Substances Act 
Emerson (1988, CA9 Cal) 846 F2d 541.
 u s c s § § g Q | e t s e q } j f n e c e s s a r y t Q a v o j d if] 
2. Administrative procedures nent hazard to public safety; thus, tempo 
Administrative rule authorizing religious exemp- placement of 3.4 methylenedioxymethamphetar 
tion for use of marijuana may not be made under (MDMA) on Schedule I by Drug Enforcer 
authority of 21 USCS § 811; however, administra- Administration is permissible. United State 
tor of Drug Enforcement Administration is re- Lichtman (1986, SD Fla) 636 F Supp 438. 
34 
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eleven utilities which responded to the 
Notice argued that revocation of | 2.14 
would be tn the public interest. 
Niagara-Mohawk Power Company 
stated that the same information is 
reported to the New York Energy Office, 
to the New York Public Service 
Commission as part of rate cases, and to 
the Electric Power Research Institute 
where it is catalogued and made 
available to the public. Georgia Power 
Company stated that the i 2.14 reports 
are redundant because of other reports 
required by other agencies. 
Consolidated Edison Company of New 
York noted its belief that reports filed 
under this section were not susceptible 
to use as a basis for Commission 
findings. 
Effective Date 
This rule is to be elective January 1, 
1U80. 
(Federal Power Art. as amended. 16 U S.C. 
7U2~828i:, Department of Energy Organization 
Art. 40 U.S.C 7101 7352. E.O 12009, 42 FR 
4tt2tt7) 
In consideration of the foregoing, Part 
2, Subchapter A of Chapter i. Title 18, 
Code of Federal Regulations is hereby 
amended as set forth below, effective 
January 1, 1980. 
By the Commission. 
Kaniutth F Plumb, 
Svt rvtory. 
§ 2.14 [ftovofcrtl 
Section 2.14 is revoked. 
|FF Hoc TO. JMJfM FVmi 12- II -7ft 145 «m( 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
Drug Enforcement Administration 
21 CFR Part 1308 
Schedules of Controlled Substances; 
Schedule II Placement of 
Phenylacetone; (Pnenyt-2-propanone, 
P2P, benzyl methyl ketone, methyl 
benzyl ketone) 
AGfMCY: Drug Enforcement 
Administration. Justice. 
ACTION; Final Order 
SUMMARY: This is n r'inul Order issued 
by the Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration placing the 
substance, phenylacetone, also known 
as phenyl 2 propanone, benzyl methyl 
ketone, methyl benzyl ketone and P2P, 
into Schedule II of the Controlled 
Substances Act. This action results from 
.the increasing evidence of use of 
phenylacetone as. a major immediate 
chemical prBcurnor to methamphetamine 
and amphetamine in their illicit 
clandestine synthesis. The effect of the 
present Order provides regulatory 
controls upon the manufacture, 
distribution, dispensing, Importation and 
exportation of this immediate precursor 
to methamphetamine and amphetamine. 
IFFtCTIVt DATS Of SCHiOUU II 
CONTftOt: February It, 1980, except as 
otherwise provided in 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
Section of thl3 Order. 
FOR FUHTWf * INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Howard McClain, Jr., Chief, Regulatory 
Control Division, Drug Enforcement 
Administration, Telephone: 202-633-
1366. 
SUPPtlMENTARY INFORMATION: In 
enacting the Controlled Substances Act 
in 1970, Congress provided in Section 
201(e) of the Act a mechanism for 
allowing the Attorney General to place a 
drug or chemical u»to a schedule of 
control without the requirement of first 
obtaining a medical and scientific 
evaluation and recommendation from 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, without having to make 
findings of his own on abuse and public 
health risk, or concerning the schedule 
considered, and without the need to 
provide an opportunity for a rulemaking 
hearing on the record in accordance 
with the Administrative Procedures Act 
(5 U.S.C. 551-559). In lieu of these 
procedures otherwise required for the 
traditional scheduling of drugs or other 
substances, Congress allowed the 
Attorney General to schedule a drug or 
substance if it was found by him to be 
an immediate piecurftor as defined in 
Section 102(22) of the Act. That section 
provides as follows: 
The term "immediate precursor" 
means a substance—(A) Which the 
Attorney General has found to be and 
by regulation designated as being the 
principal compound used, or produced 
primarily for use, in the manufacture of 
a controlled substance; (B) Which is an 
immediate chemical intermediary useo 
or likHv to be used in the manufacture 
of such trolled substance: and (C) 
The con.,»-">i of which is necessary to 
prevent, curtail, or limit the manufacture 
of such controlled substance. 
In establishing this alternative 
scheduling procedure, Congress 
intended to dispense with the formal, 
and sometimes lengthy, administrative 
regulatory rulemaking process in cases 
where the risk was that clandestine 
laboratories were making controlled 
substances with <hemicals which 
themselves were not controlled, but 
which were one sti»p removed from 
tur jir rut or becoming the controlled 
Hal)liuuu»;* illicitly manufactured. 
Congress recognized the need for this 
summary scheduling mechanism as it 
considered testimony provided to the 
House Select Committee on Crime, 91st 
Congress, 2nd Session, 1970-1971, (H. 
Rept. No. 91-1807, p. 25-6), whieh stated 
that entrepreneurs willing to set up 
clandestine laboratories to manufacture 
amphetamine and methamphetamine 
would find easy manufacture and 
realize high profits. 
DEA's own investigations have 
documented 268 illicit 
methamphetamine and 45 illicit 
amphetamine laboratories, seized from 
1975 to November 1979. More important, 
the illlicit methamphetamine 
laboratories seized in the first eleven 
months of this year is 106, compared 
with 11 seized in all of 1975. These 
statistics appear more alarming when 
one considers that DEA's enforcement 
effort obviously cannot account for 100% 
of the illicit laboratories in operation. 
Better control by DEA over this illicit 
activity could be obtained if essential 
ingredients used in the illicit 
manufacture of methamphetamine and 
amphetamine were regulated as are the 
end-products—controlled substances. 
DEA's investigations have shown that 
at least three out of four 
methamphetamine laboratories seized 
since 1976 made, purchased or used 
phenylacetone in one of two synthetic 
methamphetamine manufacturing 
processes. Of those, the more popular 
process to make methamphetamine is 
the reductive amination of 
phenylacetone with methylamine in 
ethanol with aluminum foil and mercuric 
chloride catalysts. The second 
mentioned process to make 
methamphetamine is designated as the 
Leuckart synthesis where phenylacetone 
is heated with formic acid and 
methylamine and hydrolyzed with 
hydrochloric acid. Both processes can 
produce amphetamine if methylamine is 
simply replaced by ammonia (salts). 
DEA laboratories have analyzed seized 
samples of methamphetamine and 
amphetamine of illicit manufacture and 
have identified in those samples trace 
amounts of phenylacetone. 
These investigations and laboratory 
analyses support the conclusion that 
most of the illicit methamphetamine and 
amphetamine produced by clandestine 
laboratories resulted from their use of 
phenylacetone as an essential ingredient 
in the process. 
Other trace substances haye been 
found in the above-mentioned 
methamphetamine and amphetamine 
samples seized and analyzed The trace 
Substances have been identified as by-
products of syntheHes and side-reactions 
whi re phenyliiceit'fM* at its preiuisorv 
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phenylacettc acid, was an essential 
ingredient. This«further establishes an 
additional concern that ilhcit 
' ^oratories, manufacturing 
u thamphetamine and amphetamine, in 
some cases made, rather than 
purchased, their own pheylacetone. This 
capability drives the exposure ot illicit 
laboratory activity deeper from law 
enforcement's view by replacing the 
marketplace transaction of purchasing 
phenylacetone with the hidden activity 
of making it. 
Currently, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration relies upon its Precursor 
Liaison Program to identify excessive or 
suspicious sa'ds, by manufacturers and 
wholesalers to questionable purchasers, 
of chemicals for their likely use in the 
illicit manufacture of controlled 
substances. Participating in this program 
are at least one manufacturer and 
numerous wholesalers of phenylacetone. 
However, participation is voluntary, and 
in the face of dramatically rising 
numbers of seizures of illicit 
methamphetamine and amphetamine 
laboratories in recent years, the obvious 
present need calls for requiring, not 
requesting, sales and distribution 
records and reports, security measures 
and import restrictions, to control this 
essential chemical used in the illicit 
manufacture of methamphetamine and 
amphetamine. 
Such requirements would include 
DRA registration of purchasers and 
sellers of phenytacetone. and likely 
would result in diminishing the 
unhindered sales transactions now 
occurring. 
Therefore, in view of the foregoing, 
the Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration hereby 
finds in accordance with Section 102(22) 
of the Act (21 U S.C 802(22)). that 
phenylacetone: 
{t) Is the principal compound used, or 
pioduced primarily for use. in the 
manufacture of the Schedule 11 
controlled substances 
methamphetamine or amphetamine; 
(2) Is an immediate chemical 
intermediary used or likely to be used in 
the manufacture of such substances, and 
(3) The control of which is necessary 
to prevent, curtail or limit the 
manufacture of such controlled 
substances. 
Therefore, phenylacetone Is an 
immediate precursor" of 
methamphetamine 9m\ amphetamine as 
defined in Section 102(22) of the Act (21 
t' S.C. 802(22)) and thus may be placed 
in Schedule II M* a re methamphetamine 
and amphetamtrm.. wtthftut the necessity 
of making the findings otherwise 
required by Sections 201(a) and 202(b) of 
the Act (21 U S C 811(a) and 812(b)) end 
without regard ta the proceduree 
otherwise required by Section 201(a) 
and (b) of the Ad (21 U S C 811(a) and 
(b|) Such procedures which, under the 
authority of Section 201(e) of the Act (21 
U S C 811(e)). peed not be required in 
controlling immediate precursors, 
include the rulemaking proceduree ae 
set forth in the AdmiH strati ve 
Procedures Act ( i U & C 531-460). and 
the opportunity for a hearing on the 
record 
Therefore, the Administrator of the 
Drug Enforcement Administration 
hereby dispenses with issuing Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, and the 
opportunity for a hearing on the record, 
and issues this Final Order placing 
phenylacetone into Schedule II of the 
Act as an immediate precursor to 
methamphetamine and amphetamine, 
out of high regard for the need for 
prompt controls over phenylacetone 
without undue delay, which effective 
amphetamine and methamphetamine 
control demands, and in recognition of 
the statutory authority to regulate 
precursors expeditiously in any event. 
Even so. the Administrator is 
establishing the dates on which the first 
Schedule II controls shall be imposed 
upon the legitimate manufacture, 
distribution, dispensing, importation, 
and exportation of phenylacetone to be 
no sooner than February 11. I960. 
Within this two month period between 
publication of this Order and the first 
effective dates imposing regulatory 
controls for phenylacetone, all 
interested persona may submit 
comments and objections related to the 
issue whether, and to what extent the 
required compliance by industry with 
Schedule II controls will or might likely 
hinder tbeir legitimate manufacturing 
and sales activities with phenylacetone 
so as to outweigh the expected benefit 
to result from Schedule U placement of 
phenylacetone in curbing illicit 
manufacture of methamphetamine and 
amphetamine The Administrator 
affords this opportunity for comment 
notwithstanding that he has earlier 
asked for comments by interested 
persons on this same <> <»e (40 FR 47525. 
October 9,1975). In n nse thereto, 
twenty nine letters w«v <»ved and 
the general nature of th%»<u was that 
phenylacetone Is used in the 
pharma* < Heal industry to make 
amphetamine and amphetamine like 
products, and minimally In research. 
Most respondents stated phenylacetone 
wan rrnt usfff fa ?h<Mr tTtdtntrle' 
processes, which included rubber 
processing and the manufacture of 
chemicals- Five opposed control citing 
that additional recordkeeping and 
security measures could be burdensome 
The Administrator, however, intends 
to learn how industry would currently 
regard this present control action, and 
for this reason, is offering the sixty day 
comment period established by this 
Order. 
Should the Administrator receive 
comments or objections on the 
aforementioned issue which raise 
significant questions on the ability of 
industry to comply with Schedule II 
controls for phenylacetone. he shall 
immediately suspend the effectiveness 
of this Order as it relates to this 
imposition of Schedule II regulatory 
controls until he may reconsider that 
portion of this Order in light of such 
comments and objections so filed. 
Thereafter, he may reinstate, revoke or 
amend this Order as he determines is 
appropriate. 
Comments should be submitted in 
quintuplicate to the Administrator. Drug 
Enforcement Administration. United 
States Department of Justice. 1405 I 
Street, NW. Washington. DC. 20637. 
Attention: DEA Federal Register 
Representative. Dated: December 7, 
1979. 
Therefore, pursuant to 21 U.S.C 811(e) 
and regulations of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration and of the Department 
of Justice, the Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration hereby 
orders that phenylacetone be included 
in Schedule II of the Act, and that 
S 1906.12 of Title 21. Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) be amended by 
creating a new subsection (f). 
designated Immediate precursors, and 
including therein phenylacetone as set 
forth below. Additionally, the 
Administrator takes the present 
opportunity to make a non-substantive 
change in the listing of other immediate 
precursors, by removing 1 
phenylcyclohexylamine, and 1-
piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile 
(PCC), which are immediate precursors 
to phencydidine (PCP). from where they 
currently nppear in subsection (e) 
(DepressMuhi) of } 1308.12 and re listing 
them in the new subsection (f)« and by 
re -nun; baring Secobarbital as item (5) in 
i 1308.12(e). 
130*12 Schedule*. 
* * • • 4 
(f) fmmrdiatf* precursors Unless 
specifically excepted or unless listed in 
another schedule, any material, 
compound, mixture, or preparation 
which contains any quantity of the 
following substances; 
(1) Immediate precursor to 
amphetamine and methamphetamine 
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(i) Phenyiacetone—8801 
Some trade or other names: phenyl-2-
propanonr. P2P*. benzyl methyl ketone: 
methyl benzyl ketone; 
(2) Immediate precursors to 
phencyclidine (PCP): 
(i) 1-phenylcyclohexylamine—7460 
(ii) 1-piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile 
(PCQ-eeo3 
Effective Dates 
1. Registration. Any person who 
manufactures, distributes, dispenses, 
imports or exports pherlyacetone or 
who proposes to engage in such 
activities, shall submit an application 
for registration to conduct such 
activities in accordance with Parts 1301 
and 1311 of Title 21 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations on or before 
February 11,1960. Applications for 
registration should be sent by registered 
mail, return receipt requested, to: United 
States Department of Justice, Drug 
Enforcement Administration, 
Registration Section, P.O. Box 23083, 
Central Station, Washington, D.C. 20005. 
2. Security. Phenyiacetone must be 
manufactured, distributed and stored in 
accordance with | { 1301.71,1301.72(a), 
(c), and (d), 1101.73,1301.74(aHO. 
1301.75{bKc) and 1301.76 of Title 21 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations on or 
before June 12, I960. From now until the 
effective date of this provision, it is 
expected that manufacturers and 
distributors of phenyiacetone will 
initiate whatever preparations as may 
be necessary, including undertaking 
handling and engineering studies and 
construction programs, in order to 
provide adequate security for 
phenyiacetone in accordance with DEA 
regulations so that substantial 
compliance with this provision can be 
met by June 12,1960. In the event that 
this imposes special hardships, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration will 
entertain any justified requests for 
extensions of time. 
3. Labeling and Packaging. All labels 
on commercial containers of, and all 
labeling of phenyiacetone packaged 
after June 12, I960, shall comply with the 
requirements of JJ 1302.03-1302.05 a.id 
1302 08 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations. In the event this effective 
date imposes special hardships on any 
manufacturer, as defined in Section 
102(14) of the Controlled Substances Act 
(21 U.S.C 802(14)), the Drug 
Enforcement Administration will 
entertain any justified requests for an 
extension of time. 
4. inventory. Every registrant required 
to keep records who possesses any 
quantity of phenyiacetone shall take an 
inventory pursuant to i i 1304.11-1304.19 
of Title 21 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, of all stocks of such 
substance on hand on February 11, I960. 
5. Records. All registrants required to 
keep records pursuant to f § 1304.21-
1304.27 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations shall maintain such records 
on phenyiacetone commencing on the 
date on which the inventory of such 
substance is taken. 
6. Reports. All registrants required to 
file reports with the Drug Enforcement 
Administration pursuant to SI 1304.37-
1304.41 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations shall report on the inventory 
taken under paragraph 4 above and on 
all subsequent transactions. 
7. Order Forms. The order form 
requirements of 55 1305.01-1305.16 of 
Tide 21 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations shall be in effect on the date 
which the initial inventory of this 
Schedule II controlled substance is 
taken, March 11,1960. 
8. Quotas. Quotas shall be established 
in 1960 for phenyiacetone pursuant to 
S S 1303.01-1303.37 of Title 11 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations. 
Applications for procurement quotas 
and manufacturing quotas should be 
submitted not later than February 11, 
196a 
9. Importation and Exportation. All 
importation and exportation of 
phenyiacetone shall, on or after 
February 11,1980, be required to be in 
compliance with Part 1312 of Title 21 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations. 
10. Criminal Liability. The 
Administrator, Drug Enforcement 
Administration, hereby orders that any 
activity with respect to phenyiacetone 
as a Schedule II controlled substance 
not authorized by, or in violation of, the 
Controlled Substances Act or the 
Controlled Substances Import and 
Export Act, conducted after February 11, 
1960, shall be unlawful, except that any 
person who is not now registered to 
handle phenyiacetone as a Schedule II 
controlled substance but who is entitled 
to registration under such Acts may 
continue to conduct normal business or 
professional practice with 
phenyiacetone between the date on 
which this Order is published and the 
date which he obtains or is denied 
registration: provided, that application 
for such registration is submitted on or 
before February 11,1980, 
11. Other In all other respects, this 
Order is effective February 11,1980. 
Dated: December 7,1979. 
Peter B. Bentinftr, 
Administrator, Drug Enforcement 
Administration* 
(FR Doe. 79-mU PlUd 13-11-7* MS tm] 
•tUMO COM 4410-0** 
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
Offte* of Assistant Secretary for 
Housing—Fsderal Housing 
Commfssionar 
24 CFR Part 207 
[Docket Mc. R-79-754J 
Amsndrosnts to Part 207 To Changs 
the Minimum Number of Units 
Required for Projects Insured Under 
Section 207 of the National Housing 
Act 
AGENCY: Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Housing-
Federal Housing Commissioner. 
ACTION: Final rule. 
SUMMARY: Sections 207.24 (a) and (b) 
and 20732a of Subpart A are being 
amended to reflect the change from 8 to 
5 in the minimum number of units 
required for projects insured under 
section 207 of the National Housing Act 
as authorized by the Housing and 
Community Development Amendments 
of 1978. 
EPFtCTIVf DATt: January 2,1880. 
ADORESS: Rules Docket Clerk, Office of 
the General Counsel Room 5218, 
Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 451 Seventh Street SW„ 
Washington, D.C 20410. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
George O. Hipps, Jr., Office of 
Multifamily Housing Development 
Room 8128,451 Seventh Street SW„ 
Washington, D.C. 20410; Phone: (202) 
755-5720. (This is not a toll free number.) 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: S e c t i o n 
207 of the National Housing Act has 
required that a multifamily project or a 
mobile home park have a minimum of 
eight units to be eligible for mortgage 
insurance. This minimum number was 
changed to five by the Housing and 
Commuaity Development Amendments 
of 1978 enacted October 27,197a With 
this change, proposed projects of 5, 8, 
and 7 units will be eligible for mortgage 
insurance. Existing multifamily 
apartment housing projects of five to 
seven units will also be eligible under 
Part 207 pursuant to section 223(f) of the 
National Housing Act. 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
Drug Enforcement Administration 
21 CFR Part 1308 
Schedules of Controlled Substances: 
Rescheduling of Synthetic Dronabinol 
in Sesame Oil and Encapsulated in 
Soft Gelatin Capsules From Schedule I 
to Schedule II; Statement of Policy 
AGENCY: Drug Enforcement 
Administration. Justice. 
ACTION. Final Rule and Statement of 
Policy. 
SUMMARY: This final rule is issued by 
the Administ rators! the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (UFA) to 
transfer U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approved drug 
products that consist ot synthetic 
dronabinol in sesame oil encapsulated 
in soft gelatin capsules from Schedule I 
into Schedule (I of the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA) Dronabinol is the 
svnihetic equivalent of the isomer of 
de l tas -tetrahydrocannabinol (CMC) 
which is the principal psychoactive 
substance in (Umtuibis sutiu: L 
marijuana. This action is based mi a 
finding that U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration approved drug products 
which contain dronabinol fit the 
statutory criteria for ini lusion in 
Schedule II of the CSA. As ,» lesult of 
this rule, the regulatory controls and 
criminal sanctions of Schedule II of the 
CSA wi l l apply to the manufacture, 
distribution, importation and 
exportation of dronabinol 
pharmaceutical products. This rule does 
not affect the Schedule1 I status of any 
other substance, mixture or preparation 
which is currently included in 21 CFR 
i:H)B.ll(d)(21). Tetrahydrocannabinols. 
The Administrator herein also issues a 
statement of policy regarding review, 
under the public interest criteria of 21 
U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(4). of the DEA 
registrations of practitioners who 
distribute or dispense dronabinol for 
purposes at variance with the FDA 
approved indications for use of the 
approved product. A notice is published 
elsewhere in this isue of the Federal 
Register that v Sdraws the proposed 
rule entitled Cn.mges in Protocol 
Requirements for Researchers and 
Prescription Requirements for 
Practitioners (50 FR 42184-42180. 
October 18, 1985). 
EFFECTIVE DATE: M a y VX 1980 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Howard McClain. Jr.. Chief Drug 
Control Section. Office of Diversion 
Control. Drug Enforcement 
Administration. Washington. DC 20537. 
Telephone: (202) 633-1366. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
List of Subjects in 21 CFR Part 1308 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e prac t ice and 
procedure. Drug t ra f f ic con t ro l . 
Narco t ics , Prescr ip t ion drugs. 
A proposed rule was pub l i shed n 
Federal Register on Oc tober 18. 1985 (50 
FR 42Uih-42187). p ropos ing that 
d r o n a b i n o l in sesame o i l and 
encapsu la ted m soft ge la t in 'capsu les in 
a drug product app roved by the U.S. 
Food and Drug A d m i n i s t r a t i o n be 
t rans fer red f rom Schedule I to Schedule 
I I of the Con t ro l l ed Substances A c t (21 
VI S.C. 801 et seq ) . Concu r ren t l y , a 
proposa l was pub l i shed w h i c h proposed 
changes in p ro toco l requ i rements for 
researchers and p rescr ip t ion 
requ i rements for p rac t i t i oners (50 FR 
42184-42186} In terested persons were 
g iven unt i l November 16, 1985. to submi t 
comments or ob jec t ions regard ing each 
of the proposals . 
Th i r teen i nd i v i dua l s or o rgan iza t ions 
ava i l ed themselves of the oppo r tun i t y to 
comment , ob jec t or request a-n 
adm in i s t r a t i ve hear ing, T w o ' 
o rgan iza t ions . Cannab is C o r p o r a t i o n of 
A m e r i c a and Na t i ona l O rgan i za t i on for 
the Reform of M a r i j u a n a Laws 
(NORMl .J . requested hear ings. Both 
requests for hear ings were subsequent ly 
w i t h d r a w n . Commen ts or ob jec t ions 
were submi t ted by or on beha l f of the 
f o l l ow ing : A l l i a n c e for Cannab is 
Therapeut ics, A m e r i c a n Col lege of 
Neuropsychopharmaco logy . A m e r i c a n 
M e d i c a l Assoc ia t i on . A m e r i c a n 
Pharmaceut ica l Assoc ia t i on . A r k a n s a s 
Depar tment of Hea l t h , Commi t t ee on 
Problems of Drug Dependence. Inc., Mr . 
Ans i s M. He lman i s . the l a w of f ices of 
K le in fe ld . Kap lan and Becker. M a r c o s A. 
S. L ima, M l ) . , H. C. Pars Pharmaceut ica l 
Labora to r ies and the Pharmaceut ica l 
Manu fac tu re r s Assoc ia t i on . 
H a v i n g cons idered the comments and 
ob jec t ions presented by the above l i s ted 
par t ies, the requ i rements of the 
Con t ro l l ed Substances Ac t and the 
Conven t i on on Psychot rop ic Substances 
( T . I . A S . 9725. July 15, 1980). the 
A d m i n i s t r a t o r has dec ided (a) to 
proceed w i t h the reschedul ing of 
d r o n a b i n o l as proposed at 50 FR 42180-
42187 and (b | to issue a s tatement of 
po l i cy regard ing rev iew of the 
d i s t r i bu t i on or d ispens ing of d r o n a b i n o l 
by p rac t i t i one r regis t rants w h i c h 
dev ia tes f rom app roved med ica l use to 
insure comp l i ance w i t h the ob l iga t ions 
o f the Un i t ed States as a s ignatory to the 
C o n v e n t i o n on Psychot rop ic Substances. 
The p rev ious ly p roposed regu la t ions 
re la t ing to d r o n a b i n o l are w i t h d r a w n 
elsewhere in this issue of the Federal 
Register. 
(a J Transfer of FDA Approved 
Dronabinol'Drug Products From 
Schedule I to Schedule II 
Having considered the comments and 
objections presented by the above listed 
parties and based on the investiga'ions 
and review of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, with attention to the 
obligations of the United States under 
the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances, and relying on the scientific 
and medical evaluation and 
recommendation of the Assistant 
Secretary for Health of the Department 
of Health and Human Services, acting 
on behalf of the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human 
Services, in accordance with 21 U.S.C. 
811(b). and the Food and Drug 
Administration approval of a new drug 
application for Marinol capsules, the 
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, pursuant to the 
provision- .T21 U.S.C. 811(a). finds that: 
1 Droi >1 (synthetic) in sesame oil 
and enca:' t in soft gelatin 
capsules ;>, Food and Drug 
AdniinisOatc. qiproved drug product 
has a high potential for abuse: 
2. Dronabinol (synthetic) in sesame oil 
and encapsulated in soft gelatin 
capsules in a U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration approved drug product 
has a currently accepted medical use in 
treatment in the United States or a 
currently accepted medical use with 
seven1 restrictions, and 
:\ Dronabinol (synthetic) in sesame oil 
and encapsulated in soft gelatin 
capsules in a U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration approved drug product 
may lead to severe psychological or 
physical dependence. 
The above findings are consistent 
with placement of dronabinol approved 
drug products into Schedule II of the 
CSA. The transfer of the product from 
Schedule t to Schedule II is effective on 
May 13. 1986 with selected 
implementation dates as indicated. In 
the event that this imposes special 
hardships on any registrant, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration wi l l 
entertain any justified request for an 
extention of time to comply with the 
Schedule II regulations. The applicable 
regulations are as follows: 
1. Registration. Any person who 
manufactures, distributes, delivers, 
imports or exports a FDA approved 
dronabinol drug product, or who 
engages tn research or conducts 
instructional activities with such a 
substance must be registered to conduct 
such activities in accordance with Parts 
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FR 13193), this stat nt of policy has 
been submitted foi . <ew by the Office 
of Management and Budget. In 
accordance with the provisions of 21 
U.S.C. 811(a). this order to reschedule 
certain drug products which contain 
synthetic dronabinol from Schedule I to 
Schedule II is a formal rulemaking "on 
the record after opportunity for a 
hearing." Such proceedings are 
conducted pursuant to the provisions of 
5 U.S.C. 556 and 557 and as such have 
been exempted from the consultation 
requirements of Executive Order 12291. 
Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the 
Administrator certifies that the 
rescheduling of formulations which 
contain dronabinol, as ordered herein, 
will not have a significant impact upon 
small businesses or oilier entities whose 
interests must be considered under the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (Pub. L. 90-
354. September 19. 1980). This action 
will allow the marketing of a drug 
product which has been approved bv the 
FDA. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the 
Attorney General by section 201(a) of 
theCSA(21 U.S.C. 811(a)|. as 
redelegated to the Administrator of the 
Drug Enforcement Administration by 28 
CFR 0.100. and for the reasons set forth 
above, the Administrator hereby orders 
that 21 CFR 1308.12 be amended as 
follows: 
PART 1308—(AMENDED 1 
1. The authority citation for 21 CFR 
Part 1308 continues to read as follows: 
Authority: 21 U.S.C. 811. 812. 871(b). 
2. 21 CFR 1308.12 is amended by 
redesignating the existing paragraph (f) 
as paragraph (g) and by adding a new 
paragraph (f). reading as follows: 
§1308.12 Scheduled. 
• • * « * 
(f) Halluci'nogrnic substances. 
\\) Dronabinol (synthetic) in sesame oil 
and encapsulated in d soft gelatin 
capsule in a U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration approved drug 
product 7369 
(Some other names- for dronabinol: (6a/? 
/ro/f.s")-6a.7.8.10a-tetrahydro-6.fl.9 trimethyI-3-
pentyl-6//-dibenzo(/u/)pyran 1 ol or ( )-de!ta 
9 (trans) tetrahydrocannabinol) 
* * * * * 
Dated: May 1. 1986. 
John C. Lawn, 
Administrator, Unix* Enfarcvnwnt 
Administration. 
|FR Doc. 86-10724 Filed 5-12-86; 8.45 am| 
WltHQ COOC 4410-0»-M 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation 
and Enforcement 
30 CFR Part 914 
Approval of Permanent Program 
Amendments From the State of 
Indiana Under the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 
AGENCY: Office of Surface Mining 
Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE). 
interior. 
ACTION: Final rule. 
SUMMARY: OSMRE is announcing the 
appproval of amendments to the Indiana 
Permanent Regulatory Program 
(hereinafter referred to as the Indiana 
program) received by OSMRE pursuant 
to the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA). 
On January 31.1986, Indiana 
submitted amendments to its program 
requirements regarding civil penalties, 
incidental boundary revisions and use of 
explosives. 
After providing opportunity for public 
comment and conducting a thorough 
review of the program amendments, the 
Director. OSMRE. has determined that 
the amendments meet the requirements 
of SMCRA and the Federal regulations. 
Accordingly, the Director is approving 
these amendments. The Federal rules at 
30 Part 914 which codify decisions 
concerning the Indiana program are 
being amended to implement this action. 
This final rule is being made effective 
immediately in order to expedite the 
State program amendment process and 
encourage States to conform their 
programs to the Federal standards 
without undue delay; consistency of the 
State and Federal standards is required 
by SMCRA. 
EFFECTIVE OATE: May 13. 1986 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Mr. Richard D. Rieke. Director. 
Indianapolis Field Office, Office of 
Surface Mining Reclamation and 
Enforcement. Federal Building and U.S. 
Courthouse, Room 522, 46 East Ohio 
Street. Indianapolis, Indiana 46204. 
Telephone: (317) 269-2600. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
I. Background 
Information regarding the general 
background on the Indiana State 
program, including the Secretary's 
findings, the disposition of comments 
and a detailed explanation of the 
conditions of approval of the Indiana 
program can hn. found in the July 26, 
1982 Federal Register (47 FR 32071-
32108). Subsequent actions concerning 
the Indiana program are identified in 30 
CFR 914.15 and 30 CFR 914.16. 
IK Discussion of Proposed Amendment 
On January 31,1986, the Indiana 
Department of Natural Resources 
submitted to OSMRE pursuant to 30 CFR 
732.17, proposed State program 
amendments for approval 
(Administrative Record No. IND 0453). 
The amendments modify requirements 
for civil penalty assessments, incidental 
boundary revisions and use of 
explosives. 
OSMRE published a notice in the 
Federal Register on February 26.1986. 
announcing receipt of the proposed 
program amendments and procedures 
for the public comment period and for 
requesting a public hearing on the 
substantive adequacy of the proposed 
amendments (51 FR 6751). The public 
comment period ended March 28. 1986. 
There was nc request for a public 
hearing and the hearing scheduled for 
March 24. 1986. was not held. 
III. Director's Findings 
The Director finds, in accordance with 
SMCRA and 30 CFR 732.15 and 732.17, 
that the program amendments submitteci 
by Indiana on January 31,1986. meet the 
requirements of SMCRA and 30 CFR 
Chapter VII. Only those areas of 
particular interest are discussed below 
in the specific findings. Discussion of 
only those provisions for which findings 
are made does not imply any deficiency 
in any provisions not discussed. 
Civil Penalties 
Indiana has amended 310 IAC 12-6-11 
to provide that the regulatory authority 
shall assess a penalty for a violation 
which leads to a cessation order and for 
notices of violation assigned 31 points or 
more under the point system established 
in 310 IAC 12-6-12.5. The rule provides 
that the regulatory authority may assess 
a penalty for 30 points or less. Under the 
rule, a penalty of $5000 per day shall be 
assessed for mining without a permit, 
except under certain circumstances. 
Indiana has amended 310 IAC 12-6-12 
to establish the requirements foj 
assigning points for penalties based on 
certain factors. The factors to be 
considered are: The permittee's history 
of violations at the particular operation 
(up to 30 points); the seriousness of the 
violation for which the penalty is being 
assessed (up to 15 points); the degree of 
the permittee's negligence or fault in the 
violation (up to 25 points); and degree of 
good faith determined from the 
permittees efforts to abate the violation 
(up to negative 30 points). 
2°l 
« w w * • m. 
(6) 3.4 - methytenedioxy a/nphetamlne.. 
(/) 3,4.5-trimethoxy amphetamine 
(8) Bufoienine 
Some trade and other names: 3 - (/J - CM-
methylaminoetbyi)- 5 - hydroxyindole; 3-
(2-dimethylaminoethyl) - 5 - indoW; N. N -
dimethylserotonin; 5 - hydroxy - N.N - di-
metrtyttryptamine; mappine. 
(9) Diethyltryptamine... 
Some trade and other names: N.N-Diethyt-
tryptamine; DET. 
(10) Dimethyftryptamine.. 
Some trade or other names: DMT. 
(11) Ibogaioe... 
Some trade and other names: 7 - Ethyl -
6.6/3.7.8.9,10.12.13 - octahydro - 2 -
methoxy-6,9-methano-5H-pyrido [ 1'. 
2": 1.2J azepino [5.4-b] indole; Taber-
nanthe iboga. 
Meaning all parts of the plant presently 
classified botanicalfy as Lophophora wit-
UamsS Lamaka. whether growing or not, 
the seeds thereof, any extract from any 
part of such plant, and every compound, 
manufacture, salts, derivative, mixture, or 
preparation of such plant, its seeds or ex-
tracts. 
(Interprets 2t OSC 812(c). Schedule 1(c) (12)) 
(16) N-ethyl-3-piperidyl benzilate 
(17) N-methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate... 
(18) Psitocybin 
(19)PsHocyn 
(20) Tetrahydrocannabinols 
Synthetic equivalents of the substances 
contained In the plant or in the resinous 
extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or syn-
thetic substances, derivatives, and their 
isomers with similar chemical structure 
and pharmacological activity such as the 
following: 
A1 ois or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and 
their optical isomers. 
A6 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and 
their optical isomers. 
A3.4 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and 
its optical isomers. 
(Since nomenclature of these substances is 
not internationally standardized, com-
pounds of these structures, regardless of 
numerical designation of atomic positions 
covered.) 
(21) Ethytamine analog of phencyclidine 
Some trade of other names: N-ethyl-1-
phenylcyclohexyiamine, (\ -
phonylcyclohexyl)«thvlamine, N-( 1 -
phenylcyclohoxyljethylamine, cyclohexa-
mine, PCE. 
{22) Pyrrolidine analog of phencyclidine 
Some trade or othor names. 1-(1-ph«nylcy. 
clobexyO-pyrrolidlne. PCPy. PHP. 
(23) Thiophene analog of phencyclidine 
Some trade or other names: 1-(1-(2-
thienyt)<yclorwxvl)-piperidine. 2-thieny-
lanalog of phencyclidine. TPCP, TCP. 
7400 
7390 
7433 
7435 
7260 
(12) Lysergic acid diethylamide 
(13) Marihuana 
(14) Mescaline 
(15) Peyote 
7315 
7360 
7415 
7482 
7484 
7437 
7438 
7370 
7458 
7470 
SUi' 
Title 21—Food Wnl 
(e) Depressants. Unless specific^ 
excepted or unless listed m Inri 
schedule, any material, com^a 
mixture, or preparation witfch*j 
tains any quantity of the folio] 
substances having a depressant 
on the central nervous systemt1ii*n 
Ing its salts, isomers, and salts ofj 
mers whenever the existence'of 
salts, isomers, and salts of jsomi 
possible within the specific; 
designation: ' 
(1) mecfoqualone „ 
t39 FR 22141, June 20, 1974, ai __ 
40 FR 19813, May 7, 1975; 40 FR 2WliT 
8, 1975; 41 FR 4016, Jan. 28, lOTfcbll 
43401. Oct. 1, 1976; 42 FR lHrifyUmirt 
1977; 43 FR 43295, Sspt.25, 19781 -
§1308.12 Schedule II. "^"^KL-. 
(a) Schedule II shall cons i s t^®f | | 
drugs and other substances, jt>i_ 
ever official name, commonVtSjf 
name, chemical name, or braria 
designated, listed in this section? 
drug or substance has bee: " 
the Controlled Substani 
Number set forth opposite i t 
(b) Substances, vegetable 
chemical synthesis. Unless specif! 
excepted or unless listed ln-»T 
schedule, any of the following??! 
stances whether produced 
indirectly by extraction from 
stances of vegetable origin, orAni 
dently by means of chemical?*: 
sis. or by a combination ofiexfr- ^ 
and chemical synthesis: - -*8jfjw»} 
(1) Opium and opiate, and any IJ^j 
compound, derivative, or pr^pari*™?* 
of opium or opiate, excludmgfipoi 
phine, dextrorphan, nalbuphine* 
loxone, and naltrexone, and^thclf^fS^ 
spective salts, but including the f^ol 
ing: 
1 Raw opium 
2 Opium extracts 
3 Opium fluid extracts 
4 Powdered opium 
5 Granulated opium 
6 Tincture of opium 
7 Codeine 
8 Ethytmorphine 
9 Etorphine hydrochloride 
10 Hydrocodone 
11 Hydromorphone 
12 Metopon 
13 Morphine 
M Oxycodone 
15 Oxymorphone 
lOThebaine 
86 
sajt. compound, derivative, 
itlon thereof which is chemi-
Hvalent or identical with any 
••substances referred to In para-
•%fo"U) of this section, except 
hese substances shall not include 
rjulnbline alkaloids of opium. 
fOpiiltti poppy and poppy straw. 
ypbe^ leaves (9040) and any salt, 
fid, derivative, or preparation 
'leaves, and any salt, com-
Jerivative, or preparation 
Men is chemically equivalent 
_ilfcal with any of these sub-
a^^ccept that the substances 
include decocainlzed coca 
for extraction of coca leaves. 
__ ^ extractions do not contain co-
R;(9041) or ecgonine (9180). 
i CftHcentrate of poppy straw (the 
felfe^ffact of poppy straw in either 
6i$SQiid or powder form which 
_ in84he phenanthrine alkaloids of 
iopiurn poppy), 9670. 
Ih^Oplates. Unless specifically ex-
feiShunless In another schedule 
Rjfjjpw following opiates, Including 
ibomers, esters, ethers, salts and 
liJjpf.Tsomers, esters and ethers 
tfjfi? the existence of such Iso-
" ers, ethers, and salts is possi-
i/the specific chemical desig-
£dextrorphan excepted: 
0010 
0020 
9800 
9120 
9170 
9801 
9226 
9210 
9220 
, , 9240 
— 9250 
Intermediate. 4-cyano-2-dimeth-
4,4-d^henyi butane 9254 
iwe-lntermediate, 2-methyl-3-morpbo-
l^'dip^Mnylprc^ne-cartoxyticacid 9802 
"" Tnejfmeperidine) 9230 
"~ ^ Intermediate-A, 4-cyano-1 -methyl-
. .wrkjme 9232 
WntemvKfiate-B, ethyM-phenytpi-
•oxylate 9233 
• Intermediate • C, 1-methyl- 4 • 
- 4 -carboxytec acid 9234 
9715 
• 7 9730 
—"-— g732 
9733 
hfifbnulants. Unless specifically 
or unless listed in another 
any material, compound. 
mixture, or preparation which con-
tains any quantity of the following 
substances having a Stimulant effect 
on the central nervous system: 
(1) Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and 
salts of its optical isomers 1100 
(2) Methamphetamine. its salts, iso- mers. and 
salts of its isomers 1105 
(3) Phenmetrazine and its salts 1831 
(4) MethylphenkJate — 1724 
(e) Depressants. Unless specifically 
excepted or unless listed in another 
schedule, any material, compound, 
mixture, or preparation which con-
tains any quantity of the following 
substances having a depressant effect 
on the central nervous system, includ-
ing its salts, isomers, and salts of iso-
mers whenever the existence of such 
salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is 
possible within the specific chemical 
designation: 
(1) AmooarbHal ~ 2125 
(2) Methaqualone 2585 
(3) Pentobarbital 2270 
(4) PhencyclirJne 7471 
(5) Phencyclidine immediate precursors: 
(a) 1-phenyk*dcte>rylamine 7460 
(b) 1-pip«ioTncKjyclc^exariec»rbon-
«rile(PCC) 8603 
(6) Secobarbital 2315 
[39 FR 22142, June 20, 1974, as amended at 
40 FR 6780, Feb. 14, 1975; 40 FR 10456, Mar. 
6, 1975; 41 FR 26568, June 28, 1976; 41 FR 
43401, Oct. 1. 1976; 42 FR 15680, Mar. 23, 
1977; 43 FR 21325. May 17, 19781 
§1308.13 Schedule III. 
(a) Schedule III shall consist of the 
drugs and other substances, by what-
ever official name, common or usual 
name, chemical name, or brand name 
designated, listed in this section. Each 
drug or substance has been assigned 
the DEA Controlled Substances Code 
Number set forth opposite it. 
(b) Stimulants. Unless specifically 
excepted or unless listed in another 
schedule, any material, compound, 
mixture, or preparation which con-
tains any quantity of the following 
substances having a stimulant effect 
on the central nervous system, includ-
ing its salts, isomers (whether optical, 
position, or geometric), and salts of 
such isomers whenever the existence 
of such salts, isomers, and salts of iso-
mers is possible within the specific 
chemical designation: 
87 
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(40) Properidine 
(41) Proplram 
(42) Racemoramide.. 
(43) Trimeperidine 
9644 
9640 
„ 9845 
9646 
(c) Opium derivatives. Unless spe-
cifically excepted or unless listed In 
another schedule, any of the following 
opium derivatives, Its salts. Isomers, 
and salts of Isomers whenever the ex-
istence of such salts, isomers, and salts 
of isomers Is possible within the specif-
ic chemical designation: 
(1) Acetorphine 
(2) Ac^yWihydrocodeJne 
(3) Benzylmorphine 
(4) Codeine methytjromide... 
(5) Codeine NOxide 
(6) Cyprenorphine 
(7) Desomorphine 
(8) l>»iydrc>o»orphine 
(9) Drotebanol _ 
(10) Etorphlne (except hydrochloride salt)... 
(11) Heroin 
(12) Hydromorphinol... 
(13) MethyWesorphine 
(14) MettiyldihydrorrKKpbine 
(15) Morphine methytjromide 
(16) Morphine methylsuffonate... 
(17) Morphine-N-Oxide 
(18) Myrophine 
(19) Nicocodeine 
(20) Nicomorphine 
(21) Norrnorphine 
(22) Pholcodine 
(23) Thebacon 
9319 
9051 
9052 
9070 
9053 
9054 
9055 
9145 
9335 
9056 
9200 
930! 
9302 
9304 
9305 
9306 
9307 
9306 
9309 
9312 
9313 
9314 
9315 
(d) Hallucinogenic substances. 
Unless specifically excepted or unless 
listed In another schedule, any materi-
al, compound, mixture, or preparation, 
which contains any quantity of the 
following hallucinogenic substances, 
or which contains any of its salts, iso-
mers, and salts of isomers whenever 
the existence of such salts. Isomers, 
and salts of Isomers Is possible within 
the specific chemical designation (for 
purposes of this paragraph only, the 
term "isomer" includes the optical, po-
sition and geometric isomers): 
(1) 4-brorrx>2.5-dimethoxy- amphetamine 7391 
Some bade or other names: 4 - bromo • 2.5 
• dimethoxy • a-methyfptienethylamine; 4-
bromo-2.5-DMA. 
(2) 2.5-dimethojryamphelafnine 7396 
Some trade or other names: 2.5 • dimethoxy 
- a - metftylphenetnytamine; 2,5-OMA. 
(3) 4 methoxyampbetamine 7411 
Some trade or other names: 4-methoxy a -
methylphenethytamine; 
paramethoxyamphetarnine. PMA. 
(4) 5 - methoxy • 3.4 • metnytenedtoxy- am-
phetamine 7401 
(5) 4 - methyl -2.5 - dimethoxy - amphetamine. 
Some trade and other names: 4 - methyl -
2,5 dlmethoxy-e 
methylphenethylamine; "DOM"; and 
"STP" 
(6) 3,4 • methyfenedioxy amphetamine 
(7) 3,4,5-lrimerhoxy amphetamine .... 
(8) Butotenme „ 
Some trade and other names: 3 - (fl - DH 
methytaminoethyt)- 5 - hydroxyindole; 3-
(2 rjlmethytaminoethyt) • 5 - Indotor; N. N • 
dimethylserotonin; 5 - hydroxy - N.N - rS-
rnetrryttryptamine; mappine. 
(9) Dietrtyttryptamine 
Some trade and other names: N.N-CHelbyi-
tryptamine: DET. 
(10) Ometrtyttryptamine 
Some trade or other names: DMT. 
(11) loogaine 
Some trade and other names: 7 • Ethyl • 
8.60.7.8.9,10.12.13 • octahydro - 2 -
rnethoxy-6.9Hfnethano-5H-pyhdo H \ . 
2': 1.21 azepino [5.4-bl indole: Taber-
nanthetboga. 
(12) Lysergic acid diethylamide 
(13) Marihuana „ 
(14) Mescaline 
(15) Peyote » 
Meaning at) parts of the plant presently 
classified botanicaUy as Lophophorm w0-
Hams* Lemaira, whether growing or not 
the seeds thereof, any extract from any 
part of such plant, and every compound, 
manufacture, salts, derivative, mixture, or 
preparation of such plant, its seeds or ex-
tracts. 
(Interprets 21 USC 812(c). Schedule 1(c) (12)) 
(16) N^thyt-3-pipendyl benzMate .. 
(17) N-methyl-3-piperldyt benzftate 
(18) Psftocybin 
(19)PsHocyn 
(20) Tetrahydrocannabinols 
Synthetic equivalents of the substances 
contained in the plant, or in the resinous 
extractives of Cannabis, sp. and/or syn-
thetic substances, derivatives, and their 
isomers with similar chemical structure 
and pharmacological activity such as the 
following^ 
At cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and 
their optical isomers. 
A6 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and 
their optical isomers. 
A3.4 ois or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and 
Its optical isomers. 
(Since nomenclature of these substances is 
not internationally standardized, com-
pounds of these structures, regardless of 
numerical designation of atomic positions 
covered.) 
(21) Ethytamine analog of phencyctidine 
Some trade of other names: N-ethyf-1-
phenylcyckJhexylamine. (1 -
phenylcyclohexyt>triylamine. N-(1-
r*>enyW^dohexyf)ethytamine, cyclohexa-
mine. PCE. 
(22) PyrrotirJne analog of phencycBdine 
Some trade or other names: 1-(1-phenvlcv-
ck>hexyl)-pyn-olldine. PCPy. PHP. 
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|i^23) Thiophene analog of phencyclidJne 7470 
*%. Some trade or other names: 1 - t M J -
(pT; f^enylHYctonexylJplperidine. 2-thieny. 
IgfM tanalog of phencycldlne. TPCP. TCP. 
'--t*v 
ZS&fi} Depressants. Unless specifically 
Excepted or unless listed in another 
Jscljedule. any material, compound, 
Iftxture, or preparation which con-
Sains any quantity of the following 
instances having a depressant effect 
£rj, the central nervous system, includ-
ing its salts, isomers, and salts of lso-
Kera whenever the existence of such 
Sits* Isomers, and salts of Isomers Is 
•possible within the specific chemical 
^designation: 
13 Morphine 
14 Oxycodone 
15 Oxymorphone... 
16 Thebaine. 
S f FR 22141, June 20. 1974, as amended at 
m FR 19813. May 7, 1975; 40 Fit 28611, July 
i^l»75; 41 FR 4016. Jan. 28. 1976; 41 PR 
334D1. Oct. 1, 1976; 42 FR 15679, Mar. 23. 
3977; 43 FR 43295, Sept. 25. 19781 
11308.12 Schedule II. 
(a) Schedule II shall consist of the 
drugs and other substances, by what-
ever official name, common or usual 
name, chemical name, or brand name 
designated, listed in this section. Each 
drug or substance has been assigned 
the Controlled Substances Code 
Jfiiimber set forth opposite it. 
rtjb) Substances, vegetable origin or 
c^hemical synthesis. Unless specifically 
[excepted or unless listed In another 
schedule, any of the following sub-
stances whether produced directly or 
Indirectly by extraction from sub-
stances of vegetable origin, or indepen-
dently by means of chemical synthe-
sis, or by a combination of extraction 
and chemical synthesis: 
mil) Opium and opiate, and any salt, 
compound, derivative, or preparation 
&$ opium or opiate, excluding apomor-
t>hlhe, dextrorphan, nalbuphine, na-
loxone, and naltrexone, and their re-
spective salts, but including the follow-
ing: 
£«sw opium 9600 
|20f*jm exfracts 9610 
|3 Opium fluid extracts 9620 
^Powdered opium ©639 
S Granulated optum 9640 
ffTftcture of opwm 9630 
^Codeine 9050 
!*Ethylmorphine 9190 
^tEtorpftneftydrocnlorlde 9059 
LWHydrocodone 9193 
^'Hydromorphone 9150 
||ZM«topon 9260 
9300 
9143 
9652 
9333 
(2) Any salt, compound, derivative, 
or preparation thereof which Is chemi-
cally equivalent or Identical with any 
of the substances referred to in para-
graph (b) (1) of this section, except 
that these substances shall not Include 
the Isoqulnollne alkaloids of opium. 
(3) Opium poppy and poppy straw. 
(4) Coca leaves (9040) and any salt, 
compound, derivative, or preparation 
of coca leaves, and any salt, com-
pound, derivative, or preparation 
thereof which is chemically equivalent 
or identical with any of these sub-
stances, except that the substances 
shall not include decocainized coca 
leaves or extraction of coca leaves, 
which extractions do not contain co-
caine (9041) or ecgonine (9180). 
(5) Concentrate of poppy straw (the 
crude extract of poppy straw in either 
liquid, solid or powder form which 
contains the phenanthrene alkaloids 
of the opium poppy), 9670. 
(c) Opiates. Unless specifically ex-
cepted or unless in another schedule 
any of the following opiates, including 
its isomers, esters, ethers, salts and 
salts of isomers, esters and ethers 
whenever the existence of such Iso-
mers, esters, ethers, and salts is possi-
ble within the specific chemical desig-
nation, dextrorphan excepted: 
(1) AlphaprooVie 9010 
(2) AnHeridine 9020 
(3) Bentramide 9800 
(4) Oihydrocodeme 9120 
(5) Diphenoxylate 9170 
(6) Fentanyt 9001 
(7) teomethadone. 9226 
(8) Levomethorphan. - 9210 
(9) Levorphanol 9220 
(10) Metazodne .. . 9240 
(11) Methadone 9250 
(12) Methadone-lntermediate. 4-cyanc-2-o1meth-
ylamino-4.4-diphenyl butane 9254 
(13) Moramide-Intermediate, 2-mothyl-3-morpho-
fino-1.1 -dtrjhenytrjrc^ane-arboxyic add 9802 
(14) Pethidine (meperidine) 9230 
(15) Pethidine-Jntermedtote-A. 4-cyano-1-metnyf-
4-phenytpipsrtrJne..„ 9232 
(16) Pethidine-lntermerJate-B. ethyt-4-phenytpi-
perKJine-4-csrboxytate 9233 
(17) Pethidine - Intermediate - C. 1-methyt- 4 -
phenyipipertrjne- 4 -carboxytic acid 9234 
(18) Phenazodne 9715 
(19) Pxninodine 9730 
(20) Racemethorphan 9732 
(21) Racemorphan 9733 
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(d) Stimulants. Unless specifically 
excepted or unless listed in another 
schedule, any material, compound, 
m xture, or preparation which con-
tains any quantity of the following 
substances having a stimulant effect 
on the central nervous system: 
**lts of its optical ieomani
 uoo 
Mft» of its Isomers 
(3) Pfienmetrazine and its salts 
(«> Meihytphenldate 
(e) Depressants. Unless specifically 
excepted or unless listed in another 
schedule, any material, compound, 
mixture, or preparation which con-
tains any quantity of the following 
substances.having a depressant effect 
on the central nervous system, includ-
ing Its salts, isomers, and salts of iso-
mers whenever the existence of such 
salts, isomers, and salts of foomers is 
Possible within the specific chemical 
designation: 
-Food ontj J S ^ 
1105 
1631 
1724 
TitU j , 
§1308.13 Schedule
 ( I I 
(a) Schedule Hi „»_., . ^ ^ 
drugs and other l8^11 c o n s I s t ° f t i£ 
ever official n i * u * £ ^ ***$% 
name, chemical r,*V, c o m m?n °r usutj 
designated. listed J ^ f i ^ J M ^ i 
drug or subs tanc i^ i l
 K
SeCtIott
^ * « 
the DEA Control?J1*? }*?n ^ fene* 
Number set forth ^ t ^ ^ 
(b) Stimulants,^Wf^lt > f & 
excepted or u n ^ ™ ^ f P e d f l c f l 
schedule, any S J 5 * ? 1 i n *>«&« 
mixture, or prea* Z?*1' rompdiuSg 
tains any Q u a ^ U ^ ^ S I 
substances h a v i n g o f f I t h e f f°UowlnH 
on the central n e L * f 8 t i m u l a n t ; ^ M 
Ing its salts. i s o m C ? - , t y S ^ m * H 
position, or geon£fr ^ h e 0 ^ ! r °?5<&1 
such Isomers w h e ^ '
 f ™
d
 ^ M B 
of such salts. IsouS™**?™*^ 
mers is possible t M * ^ o t m 
chemical designaU^. n e 
/ / / Thou compounds, mixture, 
in dosage unit form contakv! w P f eP*a t t o"» 
•ubatancee feted m ache**?0 " * ******* 
pound* mhritiro* «# ~.~.27H® H which com-
CI) Amobarbrtal 
(2) Methaquatone... 
(3) Pantobartjital 
(4) PhencydWina.... 
(5) Secobarbital 
2125 
2565 
- ~ 2270 
7471 
; 2315 
nif/i \mmediate Precursors. Unless spe-
cifically excepted or unless listed in an-
other schedule. any material 
w Z ^ n " ^
 l
m l x t u r e
-
 o r
 Preparation 
which contains any quantity of the fol-
lowing substances: 
(1) Immediate precursor to amphet-
amine and methamphetamine: 
(1) Phenylacetone—8501 
Some trade or other names: phenyl-2-
propanone; P2P; benzyl methyl ke-
tone: methyl benzyl ketone: 
clid2ine^CP)fG P r e C U r s o r s t o P h e n c y -
(i) l-phenylcycIohexylamlne-7460 
trile ? P ^ ^ ^ 
434M1 'rt\ *? 2 8 5 6 8 ' J u n e 2 8 . ^76; 41 PR 
risk &™2 iim M*y IZ I978: " ** 
Pounds, mixtures, or prepar* W ^ n COrTV 
on August 25. 1971. as axe l ! * * * w e r e ^ ^ 
under f 308.32. and any o ? < e d compounds 
ouantrtrve composition sho*J*L * ) * * •» • 
tnose drugs or which is thaV * * * < » * « ' < * 
H contains a lesaar quantity ? a m e •*C«P1 f * 1 
stancas „ \ * controlled sub-
(2) Benzphetamine . . . Z Z Z Z ? 
(3) CNoiphentarmina.... 
(4) Oortermine 1" * 
(5)Maiiodol '['"'. 
(6) Phendknatraanc 'N 
(c) Depressants. >T * '*& 
excepted or u n l e ^ S S ? p e c , f , ^ 1 ?J 
schedule, any m a j 1 ^ m «H>tt»«i 
mixture, or prepaid1 1 1 ' ^ m P o u " < ^ 
tains any quantity™™ J*1,10*? ~ n j j 
substances having a Z h e f o , l o w m ^ 
on the central n e r v o ^ ^ ? 1 e f f e c t 
(!) Any compound, mixture or tv 
taining; "reparation corv 
(•) Amobarbrtal.... 
W Secobarbital... z; M 
v
 231! 
*"
s
 . 2270 
or any salt thereof and ona or 
ingredients which are not ist*"** 0 0 t n 6 r a c t t v * nwdTcW 
/ov . ^d in any schedule. 
(2) Any suppository dosage form K 
0) Amobarbrtal Containing: 
(») Secobarbital 2125 
(*) Pentobarbital v 231$ 
> 2270-
or any sail of any of these drug. 
and Drug Admhistrs&on torn? , n d •PProved by the Food 
fory a^rtrig onry as a suppose 
8 6 
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|^ny substance which contains any quantity 
V « rjedvatrve of barbituric add or any salt 
|0Ct4orha»sdol... 
^nGlutathimlde.... 
g tyse tgk add... 
^ t y ^ n j i c add amide. 
MMefhyprylon... 
m S^fondiethylmathane.. 
3 Sutfonathytmethana... 
2100 
2510 
2550 
7300 
7310 
- 2575 
_ 2600 
„ 2605 
2«10 
j|) Nalorphine 9400. 
(Jte) Narcotic Drugs. Unless specif ical-
epted or unless listed In another 
rtule, any material, compound, 
Kture, or preparation containing 
__/ of the following narcotic drugs, or 
_^elr salts calculated as the free anhy-
drous base or alkaloid, in limited quan-
Sft^s asset forth below: 
<1) Not mora than 1.8 grams of codeine per 100 
* jnaMHers Of not more than 90 milligrams per 
\ rootage unit. wKh an equal or greater quantity 
1©1 an tswjJnolne alkatoid of opium 9603 
Cj Mqtmori than 1.8 grams of codeine par 100 
dosage unit, with one or more active, nonnar-
%btfo ingredwnts in recognized therapeutic 
,amounts _ 9604 
pfr Not more than 300 mitttgrsms of rjhydroco-
.rjeinone per 100 maiiliters or not more than 15 
.milligrams per dosage unrt, with a fourfold or 
"greater quantity of an isoquinolne alkaloid of 
Opium : 9605 
(4) Not more than 300 milligrams of dihydrocc-
deinone per 100 mWHrters or not more than 15 
mrHigrams par dosage unit, with one or more 
active nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized 
therapeutic amounts 9608 
(5) Not mora than 1.8 grams of dftydrocodeine 
par, 100 mWiters or not more than 90 miOi-
' grams per dosage unit, with one or more 
:
 active nonnarcotic Ingredients in recognized 
therapeutic amounts 
(Bl Not more than 300 milligrams of ethylmor-
phine per 100 milliliters or not more than 15 
milligrams per dosage unit, with one or more 
active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized 
therapeutic amounts 
(7) Not more than 500 milligrams of Opium per 
100 mHWHers or per 100 grams or not more 
'than 25 mMgrarns per dosage unit, with one 
. rjr- more active, nonnarcotic ingredients in rec-
ognized therapeutic amounts 
(8) Not more than 50 milligrams of morphine per 
100 milliliters or per 100 grams, with one or 
more active, nonnarcotic ingredtonts in recog-
nized therapeutic amounts 9810 
(39 FR 22142. June 20. 1074. AS amended at 
41 FR 43401, Oct. 1. 1976; 43 FR 3359. Jan. 
25, 1978; 44 FR 40888. July 13.19791 
91308.14 Schedule IV. 
(a) Schedule IV shall consist of the 
drugs and other substances, by what-
ever official name, common or usual 
name, chemical name, or brand name 
designated, listed in this section. Each 
drug or substance has been assigned 
the DEA Controlled Substances Code 
Number set forth opposite it. 
(b) ZVarcoftc drugs. Unless specifical-
ly excepted or unless listed in another 
schedule, any material, compound, 
mixture, or preparation containing 
any of the following narcotic drugs, or 
their salts calculated as the free anhy-
drous base or alkaloid, in limited quan-
tities as set forth below: 
(1) Not more than 1 milligram of di-
fenoxin (DEA Drug Code No. 9168) 
and not less than 25 micrograms of at-
ropine sulfate per dosage unit. 
(c) DepressanU. Unless specifically 
excepted or unless listed in another 
schedule, any material, compound, 
mixture, or preparation which con-
tains any quantity of the following 
_snhstances- Jncludiu*. lte-&alts - Jsomets-
and salts of Isomers whenever the ex-
istence of such salts, isomers, and salts 
of isomers is possible within the specif-
ic chemical designation: 
(1) Barbital 
(2) Chloral betalne i 
(3) Chloral hydrate 
(4) Cotordiazepoxide — 
(5) Clonazepam... 
(6) Oorazepete 
(7) Diazepam 
(8) Ethchkxvynol... 
(9) Ethinamate... 
(10) Flurazepam -
(11) Lorazepam 
(12) Mebutamate 
(13) Meprobamate 
9607 (14) MetnohexNal-. 
(15) Methytphenooarbital (inaphobarbital... 
(16) Oxazepam 
(17) Paraldehyde 
(18) Pethchoral 
(19) Phenobarbrtal 
(20) Prazepam 
214S 
2400 
2465 
2744 
2737 
2760 
2765 
2540 
2545 
2767 
2685 
2800 
2620 
2264 
2250 
2835 
2585 
2591 
2265 
2764 
(d) Fenfluramine. Any material, 
compound, mixture, or preparation 
which contains any quantity of the 
following substances. Including its 
salts, isomers (whether optical, posi-
tion, or geometric), and salts of such 
isomers, whenever the existence of 
such salts, isomers, and salts of iso-
mers is possible: 
(1) Fenfluramine... 1670 
(e) Stimulants. Unless specifically 
excepted or unless listed in another 
schedule, any material, compound, 
mixture, or preparation which con-
8> 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t u n d e r t h e l a w s of t h e S t a t e of Utah 
P h e n y l - 2 - P r o p a n o n e , o r P -2 -P , i s n o t a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e . How-
e v e r , i f a s u b s t a n c e has b e e n l a w f u l l y made a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e 
u n d e r t h e F e d e r a l Cont ro l led S u b s t a n c e s Act, t h e n i t i s c o n t r o l l e d 
u n d e r t h e Utah Cont ro l l ed S u b s t a n c e s Act, 
Therefore , i f t h e S t a t e p r o v e s b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e doub t : 
A: 1. T h a t t h e Uni ted S t a t e s At to rney Genera l by r u l e 
s c h e d u l e d t h e s u b s t a n c e P-2-P o r P h e n y l - 2 - P r o p a -
none a s a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e ; 
2 . T h a t t h e United S t a t e s At to rney Genera l made a 
f i n d i n g , a f t e r a h e a r i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e wi th h i s 
r u l e m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e s , which a t l e a s t a l lowed for 
a h e a r i n g on t h e r e c o r d , t h a t P-2-P h a s a p o t e n t i a l 
for a b u s e ; 
3 . T h a t t h e United S t a t e s At to rney Genera l found t h a t 
t h e s u b s t a n c e P - 2 - P : 
a . Has a p o t e n t i a l for a b u s e l e s s t h a n t h e d r u g s 
on s c h e d u l e s I a n d I I ; 
b . Has a c u r r e n t l y a c c e p t e d med ica l use i n t r e a t -
ment i n t h e Uni ted S t a t e s ; a n d 
c . Abuse of t h e s u b s t a n c e may l e a d to modera te 
o r low p h y s i c a l d e p e n d e n c e o r h i g h p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
d e p e n d e n c e ; a n d 
A. T h a t no t ice of s a i d a c t i o n was p r o p e r l y p u b l i s h e d i n 
i n t h e F e d e r a l Reg i s t e r a n d t h e Code of F e d e r a l Reg-
u l a t i o n s . ; o r 
B: T h a t the Uni ted S t a t e s A t to rney Gene ra l p r o p e r l y found, 
p u r s u a n t to a h e a r i n g and i n a c c o r d a n c e wi th h i s r u l e -
m a k i n g a u t h o r i t y , t h a t P -2 -P was a n immedia te p r e c u r s e r 
i n t h a t : 
a . t h e At to rney G e n e r a l h a s found i t to be a n d by 
r e g u l a t i o n d e s i g n a t e d a s b e i n g t h e p r i n c i p a l compound 
u sed , o r p r o d u c e d p r i m a r i l y for u s e , i n t h e m a n u -
f a c t u r e of a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e ; 
b . I t i s a n immedia te c h e m i c a l i n t e r m e d i a r y u sed o r 
l i k e l y to be u sed i n t h e m a n u f a c t u r e of a c o n t r o l l e d 
s u b s t a n c e ; a n d 
c. The control of which is is necessary to prevent 
curtail , or limit the manufacture of such controlled 
substance. 
then you may determine tha t the substance P-2-P or Phenyl-2-Propa-
none is a controlled substance under Utah Law. 
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INSTRUCTION NO . b> 
You are instructed that Phenyl-2-Propanone or 
P2P is a controlled substance under the laws of the State of 
Utah. 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
VS \ 
MICHAEL LEWIS GREEN : 
AKA JAMES ALVIN DOUGLAS ; 
Defendant ' 
1 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1
 CASE NO. 881000063 
The Defendant has filed Motions to Suppress based upon three 
separate grounds. The first that the evidence obtained pursuant 
to the search should be disallowed because of invalidity of the 
warrant. The argument is analyzed under several different criteria 
by the Defendant. That the search warrant was invalid, the 
affidavit contained insufficient information on which probable 
cause could be established, that it contained mis-statements 
which should be excised there-from, and that it omitted information, 
which had it been supplied, would have negated any probable cause. 
The Defendant argues the language in the affidavit is that 
of the Sheriff's Deputy rather than of the confidential informant. 
Though the language was not an exact quote of the confidential 
informant, the confidential informant generally stated that he 
believed the premises contained the hidden lab in the garage and 
he believed it to be producing some kind of an illegal substance. 
That, together with the information supplied from the Sheriff's 
investigator and Mr. Art Terkelson, would lead to the same con-
clusion and statement that the affiant believed that there to be 
a clandestine lab, producing legal substances located in the 
residence of Perry. 
The alleged mis-statements as characterized by the Defendant, 
in the Courts opinion, should not be excised from the affidavit 
and even if they were, there is still sufficient circumstantial 
information to support probable cause. 
The omission of information regarding the previous owner 
of the home, Mr. Bob Wendell, in this Courts opinion would not 
affect the contents of the affidavit against the State. Whether 
the previous occupant of the house was a chemistry teacher of 
high school is of little relevance to the alleged use of the 
premises at the time of question. 
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The next basis for attack by the Defendant, is that the 
information supplied to the Court was stale, and therefore 
invalidates the issuance of the warrant. Only part of the in-
formation was older, in fact after receiving the information 
from the confidential informant, the Sheriff's detectives con-
tinued to observe the premises for a substantial period there-
after. If in fact the lab at the premises were used as a 
clandestine lab, it was not the kind of operation that would 
likely cease and become stale in a matter of a few months. 
Secondly, the continued surveilance up until the first part of 
September, shortly before the issuance of the warrant would 
substantiate the fact that the information was not stale. The 
follow-up surveilance and observation of the premises by the 
Sheriff's Office would indicate caution on their part to not 
seek a warrant based only upon the information supplied by the 
confidential informant but rather as supported the investigation. 
The last basis for attack on the warrant is the officers 
exercise of improper zeal in execution of the warrant. The 
friend of the Defendant and co-occupant of the house may have 
standing to argue constitutional rights before this Court. 
Certainly this Defendant has no standing to argue any violations 
of her constitutional rights. 
Taking the Defendant back to the premises upon his arrest 
rather than to the police station or otherwise, appears under 
the circumstances of this case to be the proper exercise of 
caution both for the protection of the Defendant and for the 
police officers. Most importantly, there appears to be nothing 
in the action of the police officer which this Court construes 
to be malicious. Therefore the Motion to Suppress the evidence 
based upon the alleged faulty search warrant are denied. 
The next basis for the Motion to Suppress, is that Andre 
Pommier, the confidential informant was a Government employee or 
agent when he discovered the lab and therefore breached the 
Defendants constitutional rights. This Court indicated at the 
time of the hearing that its not convinced that Mr. Pommier was 
an agent of the State, nor that he was acting as an agent at the 
time he was in the Defendants home and conducting, which has been 
characterized as, investigations. There is nothing to show that 
his "investigations" had anything to do with his positions as 
voluntary fireman or Deputy Fire Marshall. 
The Defendant would suggest that because of Mr. Pommierfs 
illegal activity, the State therefore should be precluded from 
using the evidence. The State on the other hand suggests that 
Mr. Pommier should be commended as a concerned citizen. This 
Court cannot condone Mr. Pommier1s activity which was an 
apparent tresspass of the Defendants rights. That trespass, 
however, does not vitiate the State's ability to use the informa-
tion even though obtained by unlawful activity by Mr. Pommier. 
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The next Motion to Suppress by the Defendant is that 
certain chemicals were destroyed. This situation usually arises 
when the evidence which is being tested is destroyed during the 
testing. In this case, the evidence which was tested has not 
been destroyed and there is sufficient left for examination by 
the Defendant. The Defendant argues that other chemicals were 
destroyed and therefore all the evidence should be suppressed. 
To the contrary, evidence which was destroyed was considered to 
create a hazard and the State had no facilities in which to store 
the same. Identities of those chemicals appears not to be an 
issue here and those chemicals which are an issue and which were 
tested and could have been re-tested by the Defendant. 
In addition to all of the above, there appears no malice or 
bad faith exercised on behalf of the State in destruction of 
that evidence, and therefore the Motion to Suppress by the 
Defendant is hereby denied. 
Dated this 1st day of March, 1989. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH ART. V, § 1 
hold over; he mav'resign. Tooele County v. of that office. Snow v. Keddington, 113 U. 
Pe La Mare, 90 *U. 4«, 51) V. 2d 1155, 10G :?25, 195 P . 2d 234. 
A. L. R. 1S2, superseding 90 U. 23, 39 P. 
2d 1051, and following Slate ex rel. Slain Collateral References. 
v. Christensen, 84 U. 185, :>5 P. 2d 775. Beginning or expiration of term of elec-
tive office where no time fixed by Law, 80 
Indefinite term of office.
 A . L. 11. 1200, 135 A. L. It. 1173. 
General rule that term for which officer Power of hoard to make appointment to 
is elected shall be fixed before election is office or contract extending beyond its 
inapplicable where voters, at same elee- own term, 11!) A. L. I{. 'A'.U't. 
tion, vote on officer and also on proposed "Unt i l" as word of inclusion or exclu-
coustitutional amendment extending term sion where term of office runs until a 
specified day, 10 A. L. K. 1100. 
Sec. 10. [Oath of office.] 
All officers made elective or appointive by this Constitution or by the 
laws made in pursuance thereof, before entering upon the duties of 
their respective offices, shall take and subscribe the following oath or 
affirmation: "1 do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey 
and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution 
of this State, and that I will discharge the duties of my office with 
fidelity. ["] 
Compiler's Notes. deputy county clerk (a person duly au-
The quotation marks at the end of this thorized to administer oaths) although he 
section have been carried in brackets in d i d n o t go through some formal r i tual , 
all compilations since Kevised tStatutes of w i t h t l i e raising of his right hand. State 
l b 9 8 # v. Mathews, 13 U. (2d) 391, 375 P . 2d 392. 
Comparable Provision. Supreme Court justices required to take 
Montana Const., Art . XTX, § 1. 0a,t!h' 
Judges of the Supreme Court subscribe 
Cross-Reference. to this oath when entering upon their 
O-iths of oflicers 5°-l-l duties as justices thereof. Critchlow v. 
' ' Monaon, 102 U. 378, 131 P . 2d 794. For 
Bond required in addition to oath. sequel to this case, see State ex rel. Jugler 
Sta tute requiring state treasurer to give v. Grover, 102 U. 459, 132 P. 2d 125. 
bond is not unconstitutional on ground 
that legislature could not add to require- CoUateral References. 
ment iu this section. State .ex rel. Stain OflicersC=33G(l). 
v. Christensen, 84 U. 185, 35 P . 2d 775. 67 C.J.S. Officers § 38. 
Formal r i tual unnecessary. Member of grand or peti t jury as officer 
A deputy county recorder took the oath within constitutional or s tatutory provi-
of office, required by this section, by his sions in relation to oath or affirmation, 
signing of oath form duly notarized by a 118 A. L. R. 1098. 
ARTICLE V 
D I S T R I B U T I O N OF P O W E R S 
Section. 
1. [Three departments of government.] 
Section 1. [Three departments of government.] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided 
into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the 
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions 
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appertaining to either of the others, 
directed or permitted. 
Comparable Provision. 
Montana Const., Art. IV, § I. 
Cross-References. 
Kxecutive department, Const. Art. VII . 
Judicial department, Const. Art . VI I I . 
Legislative department, Const. Art . VI. 
Municipal powers not delegable, Const. 
Art. VI, §21). 
Crimes and criminal procedure. 
This section precludes the Supremo 
Court from declaring any conduct a crime, 
no matter how morally reprehensible it 
may be, where it is not so declared by 
the legislature. State v. Johnson, 44 U. IS, 
137 P . 032. 
The Indeterminate Sentence Law, 77-
35-20, is not violative of this section as 
depriving the court of any constitutional 
power of authority guaranteed to it. Mn-
tar t v. P ra t t , 51 U. 240, 170 1\ 07. 
Declaratory judgments. 
Quoting from Anderson on Declaratory 
Judgments , § 8, p. -7 , "A controversy, in 
the sense in which the word is used in 
the Constitution in defining judicial power, 
particularly of the federal courts, must 
be one that is appropriate for judicial 
determination as distinct from a differ-
ence or*disf>ute of hypothetical or abstract 
character or from one which is academic 
or moot, but must be definite and con-
crete, touching the legal relation of the 
parties in adverse legal interest, and must 
be a real substantial controversy admit-
ting of specific relief through a decree 
conclusive in character as distinct from 
an opinion or advice of what the law 
would be on a hypothetical state of facts." 
Lyon v. Bateman, 119 U. 434, 228 P . 2d 
818. 
Declaratory statutes affecting existing 
judgments. 
After court has interpreted or con-
strued s ta tute on trial of case, and ren-
dered judgment, legislature cannot affect 
judgment by declaratory or explanatory 
s ta tute , giving s tatute , under which judg-
ment was rendered, different construction. 
In re Handley's Estate , 15 IT. 212, 49 P . 
S29, 02 Am. St. Rep. 920, on motion for 
rehearing in 7 U. 49, 24 P . 073, appeal 
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, 151 
IT. S. 443, 3S L. Ed. 227, 14 S. Ct. 386. 
When court construes s tatute, involved 
in case, and holds that it has certain 
effect and renders judgment accordingly, 
legislature cannot thereafter declare tha t 
s ta tu te , as to case in which judgment was 
except, in the eases herein expressly 
rendered, had effect other than that de-
clared by court. In re Ilandlev's Estate , 
15 U. 212, 49 P . 829, G2 Am. St". Rep. 92G, 
on motion for rehearing in 7 U. 49, 24 P. 
0*73, appeal dismissed on jurisdictional 
grounds, 151 U. S. 443, 38 L. Ed. 227, 14 
H. Ct. 3S0. 
Delegation of judicial power. 
Irrigation District Art of 1909, as 
amended by Laws of 3911, did not violate 
this section on ground that judicial powers 
were conferred upon certain persons. 
State ex rel. Lundberg v. Green River Irr . 
Dist., 40 U. 83, 119 P. 1039. 
Uniform Land Registration Act of 1917 
was not invalid as a t tempting to confer 
judicial authority on county clerks of 
s tate as ex officio registrars of title in vio-
lation ot* this provision. Ashton-Jenkins 
Co. v. Bramcl, 5G II. 587, 192 P. 375, 11 A. 
L. It. 752. 
Workmen's Compensation Act is not in-
valid because it delegates to industrial 
commission the power to hear, consider, 
and determine controversies between liti-
gants as to ult imate liability, or their 
property rights. Utah Fuel Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm., 57 U. 240, 194 P. 122. 
While term "judicial power" embraces 
all suits and actions whether public or 
private, it docs not necessarily include 
the power to hear and determine matters 
not necessarily in nature of suit or action 
between parties and does not apply to 
those cases where the judgment is exer-
cised or is to be exercised as a mere 
incident to execution of a ministerial 
power or duty. Citizens' Club v. Welling, 
83 U. 81, 27 P . 2d 23. 
Industrial commission is an administra-
tive body and has no power 1o perform ju-
dicial acts or exercise judicial functions, 
and hence has no jurisdiction of action to 
recover additional compensation for em-
ployees employed on public works on 
ground that they were not paid prevailing 
wage rate. Logan City v. Industrial Comm., 
85 U. 131, 38 P . 2d 7G9. 
Order of public service commission deny-
ing a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity is not an exercise of a judicial 
function within meaning of this section. 
Mulcahy v. Public Service Comm., 101 U. 
245, 117 P . 2d 298. 
Statutes empowering the secretary of 
s tate to revoke charters of social clubs for 
violating law arc valid as against the 
contention that judicial power is conferred 
upon the secretary of state. Citizens' Club 
v. Welling, 83 TJ. 81, 27 P . 2d 23; Kent 
Club v. Toronto, G IT. (2d) 67, 305 P . 2d 
870. 
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